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The underlying technology of Bitcoin is blockchain, which was initially designed for financial value transfer
only. Nonetheless, due to its decentralized architecture, fault tolerance and cryptographic security benefits
such as pseudonymous identities, data integrity and authentication, researchers and security analysts around
the world are focusing on the blockchain to resolve security and privacy issues of IoT. However, presently,
not much work has been done to assess blockchain's viability for IoT and the associated challenges. Hence,
to arrive at intelligible conclusions, this paper carries out a systematic study of the peculiarities of the IoT
environment including its security and performance requirements and progression in blockchain technologies.
We have identified the gaps by mapping the security and performance benefits inferred by the blockchain
technologies and some of the blockchain-based IoT applications against the IoT requirements. We also
discovered some practical issues involved in the integration of IoT devices with the blockchain. In the end,
we propose a way forward to resolve some of the significant challenges to the blockchain's adoption in IoT.
Keywords: Blockchain, Internet of Things, consensus protocols, IoT security, decentralized IoT, blockchain
challenges.
1. Introduction
There has been an exponential growth in the Internet of Things (IoT) based services in the world,
especially in telehealth, manufacturing and in urban areas to form smart cities. IoT is expected to connect
30 billion devices by 2020 [1]. Use of IoT technology will not only improve the quality of life of people but also
contribute to the world economy. IoT is predicted to create about USD 7.1 trillion contributions to the global5
economy by 2020 [1]. However, at the same time, IoT devices are vulnerable to a vast number of security
and privacy issues, which are known to the manufacturers but security in IoT devices is either neglected or
treated as an afterthought [2]. According to IBM Institute for Business value [3], it is critical for the future
of IoT that its operational model is revived from costly, trusted and over-arched centralized architecture to a
self-regulating and self-managed decentralized model. Such a transformation will provide scalability, reduced10
cost of infrastructure, autonomy, secure operations in a trustless environment, user-driven privacy, access
control and redundancy against network attacks. In this regard, blockchain is being considered as one of the
possible mechanisms to realize desired decentralization and resultant trustless networks [4].
Although blockchain was initially conceived as a financial transaction (TX) protocol in the form of Bitcoin,
but due to its cryptographic security benefits such as pseudonymous identities (IDs), decentralization, fault15
tolerance, TX integrity and authentication, researchers and security analysts around the world are focusing
on the blockchain to resolve security and privacy issues of IoT. However, default limitations of Bitcoin
blockchain, such as scalability, latency in TX confirmation, large storage, intensive computation and energy
requirements, and privacy leakage infer that blockchain technology has to be assessed deeply before it can be
used securely and efficiently in an IoT environment.20
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Related Work. Till date, numerous surveys and some research on blockchain-based IoT technology [4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] has been published but either these papers focus on general applications of the blockchain or
discuss technical aspects concerning digital currencies. They do not give an insight into blockchain challenges
related to IoT. For instance, [5] highlights various security, privacy and performance issues such as DDoS
attacks, 51% attack, data malleability, authentication, cryptographic, energy consumption and usability25
problems. However, these issues have been discussed concerning cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ripple and
Bitcoin exchanges. The paper also identifies some of the research areas such as scalability, smart contracts,
licensing, IoT, security, and privacy, which have been neglected in current research. For the most of the part,
[5] presents the methodology of its research and broadly highlights the current research topics. Moreover, if
we look from IoT perspective, [5] does not focus on this issue. Similarly, [6] carries out a detailed survey of30
blockchain technologies and their impact on society and economy. It discusses the problems associated with
Bitcoin blockchain. It also draws attention to the wide utilization of blockchain technologies, but IoT is just
a point in the long list of potential use cases of the blockchain. Finally, it addresses the issues related to
administration and policy guidelines.
In another work [7], authors give an overview of blockchain technology, discuss its variants such as Ethereum35
[13], Ripple [14], Gridcoin [15], etc., and present a gist of some non-financial applications of the blockchain.
It also does not address issues concerning blockchain's adoption in IoT. Similarly, [8] presents a wholesome
survey on technical aspects of digital currencies. It discusses the Bitcoin characteristics and related concepts
especially the consensus protocols in much detail but with respect to digital currencies. Although the papers
mentioned above have covered various aspects of digital currencies and blockchain in detail, but they are not40
focused on IoT. Moreover, authors in [9] present a light weight architecture of a smart home. However, the
paper just focuses on the limitations of Bitcoin blockchain and propose a solution to avoid Bitcoin's issues of
computation intensiveness, latency in TX confirmation and scalability. Correspondingly, the authors compare
the security and performance efficiency of their solution with Bitcoin blockchain only.
In yet another work, authors in [10] propose one of the use cases of the blockchain for IoT, i.e., configuring45
and managing IoT devices using blockchain smart contracts. By doing so, authors aim to avoid the security
and synchronization issues involved in a client-server model. Where, if a server gets malicious then all
the connected devices will be vulnerable to security issues. Therefore, taking advantage of blockchain's
trust-free distributed architecture the IoT devices are proposed to be configured and managed through
Ethereum smart contracts [13]. Moreover [11] carries out a literature review of blockchain applications50
beyond cryptocurrencies and their suitability to IoT. The review also aims at finding solution to Bitcoin
blockchain related vulnerabilities, such as integrity attacks, de-anonymization techniques, and adaptability
of Bitcoin blockchain in IoT concerning high TX input in IoT. Whereas, [4] gives an insight into the working
of blockchain and smart contracts [13]. The authors prudently highlight the blockchain-IoT use cases such
as a market place for sharing services and resources between IoT devices, P-2-P (Peer-to-Peer) market for55
renewable energy and supply chain management (SCM). The paper also highlights some issues about the use
of blockchain in IoT. These issues include low TX throughput, high latency in PoW-based blockchains, the
privacy of users and TX contents, legal matters associated with smart contracts and the need for changes.
Similarly, authors in [12] have also made a valuable contribution to the Bitcoin research. They have carried
out an in-depth analysis of numerous Bitcoin properties, stability issues, and Bitcoin forks. Authors also60
gave an overview of alternatives to Bitcoin consensus and user anonymity/privacy techniques.
Therefore, to cover the gaps in the literature concerning blockchain's adoption in IoT, there is a requirement
of carrying out a comprehensive survey to find out that how does existing blockchain technologies impact
IoT? Similarly, how can IoT leverage blockchain to resolve its security issues? and what are the impediments
in doing so? This paper thus carries out a methodical review of the IoT threat environment, resultant IoT65
security and performance requirements and the impact of progression in blockchain technologies on IoT.
The benefits afforded by the blockchain technologies and some of the blockchain-based IoT applications are
pitched against the IoT security and performance requirements to identify the voids. We also carried out a
comparison of some of the notable blockchain consensus protocols based on certain security and efficiency
factors to determine a suitable technology for the IoT. It is presumed that Hyperledger-Fabric meets the70
most of the IoT requirements such as user authentication and authorization, identity management, data
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confidentiality, low latency in TX confirmation and means to achieve autonomous IoT operations using
smart contracts also known as “Chaincodes”. To discover some practical issues involved in the integration of
IoT devices with the blockchain, we implemented an Ethereum blockchain-based IoT supported supply chain
monitoring system in an experimental setting. We discovered that there are some challenges in securely75
sending sensor data from the IoT devices to the blockchain. It is also noticed that currently there is no
mechanism to perform a device integrity check, to ascertain the validity of IoT devices. Whereas, it is an
important security requirement, since, IoT devices mostly operate in an unprotected environment and are
vulnerable to physical compromise, which can result into malicious device operation. We also establish that
there is a requirement for IoT-oriented TX validation rules and IoT-focused consensus protocol to meet80
the specific needs of IoT environment. In the end, a way forward is recommended to address some of the
significant blockchain issues. Hence, there are many factors that make our work distinguished from our
predecessors.
Contributions of the Paper. The primary objective of this paper is to identify unscaled challenges that
hamper total adoption of blockchain in an IoT environment. The major contributions of the paper are:85
1. Detailed analysis of progression in blockchain technology and its impact on IoT in view of security and
performance requirements of IoT.
2. Identification of some unique and practical challenges to the blockchain's adoption in IoT.
3. Analysis of few existing blockchain applications and related voids.
4. A way forward to address some of the critical IoT related blockchain issues.90
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section-2 provides a background on IoT
architecture, introduces IoT threat environment and some security and performance requirements of IoT
systems. In Section-3, some important blockchain concepts especially the consensus protocols are illustrated.
Progression in blockchain technology, and its impact on IoT is highlighted in Section-4. Whereas, Section-
5 presents current challenges to the blockchain's adoption in IoT. Latest trends in blockchain-based IoT95
applications and related issues have been covered in Section-6. Gap analysis and a way forward to address
some of the significant challenges is presented in Section-7 and Section-8 respectively. Finally, the paper is
concluded with a hint of future work in Section-9.
2. IoT Background
This section presents a brief background on IoT including IoT architecture, difference between IoT and100
traditional networks, threat environment and some security and performance requirements of IoT systems.
2.1. IoT Architecture
Due to the lack of standardization of IoT products the world has not yet been able to agree on a single IoT
reference model [16]. Correspondingly, as shown in Figure-1, layered architectures and their tasks/functions
or purpose discussed in the different literature [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] have slight variations. For instance [16]105
presents a 5-layered IoT architecture comprising Objects or Perception Layer, Object Abstraction Layer,
Service Management also called as Middleware Layer, Application Layer, and The Business Layer. The
tasks/functions or purpose of each layer are shown in the respective colored box in Figure-1. The Objects
or Perception Layer is responsible for querying and collecting sensor data and then forward it to the Object
Abstraction Layer. The Object Abstraction Layer acts almost like the Network Layers depicted in all other110
models, i.e., transfer the data received from the objects (devices) to the next higher layer, i.e., Service
Management or Middleware Layer, through various communication protocols such as RFID, 3G/4G, WiFi,
BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy), infrared, ZigBee, etc. It can also perform other functions such as cloud
computing and handling of data management processes [16]. The Application Layer performs the typical
tasks such as service delivery to the customers/users, provision of an interface to the business layer for high-115
level data analysis and management of controlled access to data. Lastly, the Business Layer manages all the
activities and services, builds a business model, performs Big data analysis for strategic decision making [16].
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Figure 1: Variations in The Layered Architecture of IoT
However,[17] deliberates upon a 4-layered architecture with a distinction between Physical and the Perception
Layer. The Physical Layer comprising basic hardware including smart appliances and power supplies acts as a
backbone for networking the smart objects. The perception Layer performs the usual task of collecting sensor120
data, and the Network Layer provides the means to transfer data between devices. Finally, the application
layer performs the task of service delivery.
Contrary to the previously discussed IoT architectures, [18] introduces a 3-layered model comprising the
Sensor, Network, and the Application Layer. However, all these layers perform the same tasks as their
equivalent, discussed in the previous two models. There is another 5-layered IoT architecture discussed in125
[19], which has almost the same layers as highlighted in [16] with a slight variation in the naming convention of
layer two. However, the tasks/functions of the layers are nearly similar. Lastly, the authors in [20] introduce a
4-layered IoT architecture comprising Sensing, Networking, Cloud and Application Layer. The notable thing
here is the Cloud Computing Layer instead of Service management or a Middleware Layer. The authors
propose that the Cloud servers having more computing power, better data analytic features and storage130
capacity, can better handle the huge data coming from the heterogeneous IoT devices and respond quickly
based on emergency event-aware strategies. Whereas, the Middleware has certain issues such as though it can
mask the differences in operating systems and network protocols, however, most of the Middleware services
use proprietary protocols, which affect the interoperability. Moreover, Middleware services also suffer from
time delay and memory overhead amid incompatible protocols of subsystems [20]. The authors claim that135
the cloud servers provide an abstract layer and can flawlessly realize the communication for heterogeneous
systems.
2.2. Difference between IoT and Traditional Networks
The above-mentioned peculiarities make IoT different from traditional IT networks. These differences
are important to be highlighted as they influence the development of requisite security and privacy solutions140
for IoT systems. The significant difference between conventional networks and IoT is the level of resources
available at the end devices [21]. IoT usually comprises resource constraint embedded devices such as RFID
and sensor nodes. Low memory, low computing power, and small battery life are the hallmarks of typical IoT
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devices. Whereas, the traditional networks comprise powerful computers, servers, and smartphones that have
ample resources. The traditional networks can, therefore, be secured by complex and multi-factor security145
protocols without any resource consideration. Contrary to this, IoT systems require lightweight security
algorithms that should maintain a balance between security and resource consumption such as battery life,
memory and processor usage.
IoT devices mostly connect to the internet or gateway devices through low bandwidth and low power wireless
communication media such as 802.15.4, 802.11a/b/g/n/p, LoRa, ZigBee, NB-IoT and SigFox. Whereas, end150
devices in the traditional IT networks communicate through more secure and faster wired/wireless media
such as fiber optics, DSL/ADSL, WiFi, 4G, and LTE. Another difference is that the traditional network
devices have almost the same OS and data format, but in the case of IoT because of application-specific
functionality and lack of OS, there are different data contents and formats. Hence, because of this diversity,
it is difficult to develop a standard security protocol that fits all types of IoT devices and systems. As a155
result, a wide range of IoT threats are still at loose and threaten the security and privacy of the users.
If we look at the security design, traditional networks are secured by a blend of static network perimeter
defense based on firewalls, IDS/IPS, and the end devices are secured by host-based approaches such as
anti-virus and security/software patches. Whereas, the host-based security approach cannot be applied to
the resource constraint IoT devices [22]. Similarly, because of the IoT devices' vulnerabilities such as lack of160
physical security, the absence of host-based defense mechanisms (e.g., anti-virus), lack of software updates and
security patches, lack of access control measures, cross-device dependencies (e.g., a light sensor is triggered by
a light bulb), and lack of IoT-focused attack signatures, the conventional perimeter defense mechanism cannot
protect the IoT devices from insider attacks and physical compromise by unauthorized employs/personnel.
Correspondingly, the low bandwidth, low power and less secure IoT wireless communication protocols [23,165
24, 25], weak application security, and vulnerable web applications and APIs [26, 27] make IoT devices an
ideal target for the attackers. Moreover, there is a lack of consistency and standardization in IoT solutions
across the globe due to which there are issues related to interoperability, compatibility, and manageability
[28].
2.3. IoT Threat Environment170
It is estimated that with the rise in number of things connected to IoT systems to swarming billions of de-
vices by 2020, the potential vulnerabilities will also increase [29]. Hence, the increase in vulnerabilities due to
non-standardization of IoT technologies may give rise to security incidents in IoT systems. Correspondingly,
the successful launch of sophisticated cyber-attacks like Mirai [30], Ransomware [31], Shamoon-2 [32] and
DuQu-2 [33] on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and IoT in recent past have rendered existing IoT protocols175
ineffective and have proved that IoT systems/devices are vulnerable to cyber-attacks resulting into ransom
payment, data theft, data forgery and other spurious behaviour such as botnet attacks. In addition, mostly
being deployed in a hostile or unprotected environment, IoT devices are vulnerable to physical compromise.
In a practical manifestation of such an attack, researchers in [2] compromised a smart controller of a house
automation system through an open UART interface. Once the researchers gained access to the device, they180
were able to view the start-up sequence. They modified the boot parameters and gained low-level access
to the device. They also brute forced the root password and launched network layer attacks such as port
scanning and network traffic analysis.
Moreover, despite centralization and controlled access to data, even the cloud-supported IoT is vulnerable
to security and privacy issues [34]. It is estimated that at least one-fifth of the documents uploaded to185
file-sharing services contains sensitive information and 82% of cloud service providers ensure data security
during transmission. However, only 10% encrypt data, once it is stored in the cloud [35]. Cloud being the
trusted party is vulnerable to single point of failure, data privacy breach including unauthorized data sharing
and unauthorized data analytics [36]. The disclosure of personal data leakage concerning 87 million users
by Facebook Inc. in April 2018 is a candid example of one of the cloud vulnerabilities [37]. Hence, Security190
flaws in IoT are thus leading to attacks on device integrity, data integrity, secrecy and privacy, attacks on the
availability of network and attacks on the availability and integrity of services, e.g., DoS (Denial of Service)
and DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) Attacks [38]. The current security issues in IoT can be attributed
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to the poor security-aware design of devices, scarcity of memory, power and computational resources, and
trust in cloud-based applications.195
Based upon above-discussed resource constraint peculiarities of IoT devices and IoT threat environment, we
have deduced some security and performance requirements for future IoT systems. Hierarchical model of
these requirements is reflected in Figure-2 and Figure-3 respectively.
Figure 2: Security Requirements for IoT Systems
2.4. Security Requirements
The design and development of future IoT systems and devices is envisaged to be somewhat standardized200
as per the security requirements depicted in Figure-2. The essential security requirement of an IoT system
is to be able to operate in a trustless environment. Moreover, most of the IoT applications rely on sensors'
data. Hence, unforgeable storage and security against data manipulation and unauthorized sharing is also
required. Furthermore, most of the IoT devices, such as smart city environmental sensors (temperature, hu-
midity, gas, etc.), surveillance cameras and intelligent traffic system sensors being deployed in public places205
without much protection are vulnerable to physical compromise [39, 40]. Hence, no operation in an IoT
system can be termed safe unless the integrity of the code installed on the IoT device and the integrity of
the data being shared between devices is ensured [41]. Therefore, device security is another important aspect
that needs attention by the manufacturers and the security researchers. To protect the network against node
compromise and malware attacks, the IoT systems need to authenticate devices before adding them to the210
network. Similarly, there should be frequent checks to attest the integrity of the code installed on the devices.
In case of any suspicion about the device software, the respective node should be revoked temporarily until
the secure software update is performed.
IoT devices should also be tamper-resistant concerning both hardware and software modifications. Another
vulnerable issue is that due to the scarcity of memory, power and computation resources, redundant cryp-215
tographic security measures cannot be implemented in IoT devices [21]. However, still, IoT devices need
some lightweight cryptographic security along with efficient key management system, in which compromised
keys should be revoked and updated as and when required. Another important requirement is user security
including enrolment, ID management, authentication, and authorization. In addition, a secure IoT system
requires protection against unauthorized access to the network and user data.220
2.5. Performance Requirements
Due to reliance on real-time data sharing by most of the IoT systems like VANETS, Wireless Sensors
Networks (WSN), ICS, smart grids, smart homes and SCM, the performance efficiency of the IoT system is as
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Figure 3: Performance Requirements for IoT Systems
important as its security. Some of the performance requirements desired in IoT systems are shown in Figure-
3. To protect future IoT systems against human errors, they need to be self-regulated and self-managed.225
An efficient IoT system must cater for the constraint resources of end devices including low memory, low
power consumption, and low computational ability. However, increase in performance efficiency should not
be on the pretext of compromising the security of the system. Moreover, increase in the number of users/IoT
devices in future, will result in the generation of more data. Therefore, it is imperative that respective IoT
system should be able to accommodate future network expansion and handle a large number of messages230
with high throughput.
The existing threat spectrum coerces the need of a sophisticated security mechanism for IoT. Many security
researchers visualize blockchain as the silver bullet to augment IoT security. Therefore, before proceeding
further, it is essential to get familiarized with the blockchain technology.
3. Blockchain: An Overview235
The Bitcoin [42] has very innovatively transformed the method of financial value transfer without any
trusted third party. The underlying technology of Bitcoin is blockchain. In simple terms, blockchain comprises
a series of blocks in such a way that every new block is cryptographically connected to the previous block.
In case of Bitcoin, the blocks contain a record of financial TXs between Bitcoin users. Due to its inherent
benefits, such as immutability, auditability, TX integrity and authentication, fault tolerance, and above all240
trust-free operation, blockchain is being envisaged to play a vital role in the security of IoT ecosystem. Various
benefits of Bitcoin blockchain and how they are achieved are enumerated in Table-1, and some important
concepts concerning blockchain technology are illustrated below.
3.1. Key Concepts
Transaction (TX). A process that results in the change of state of the blockchain. Depending upon245
blockchain platform, a TX ranges from the transfer of a financial value to the execution of an arbitrary code
in the form of a smart contract [44]. Moreover, in case of an IoT environment, a TX may be a means of
sharing user or environment sensors' data.
Block. It is a set of TXs that happened in the recent past and have not been confirmed yet. The block also
has a block header that contains, blockchain version number, hash of the previous block, a random nonce,250
time stamp and Merkle Root Hash of all the TXs included in the block.
Blockchain. It is a distributed public ledger that keeps a record of all the TXs/blocks [42]. Vitalik Buterin
in [45] gives another perspective that the essence of the blockchain is informational and processual, and does
not relate directly to the monetary sphere.
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Table 1: Benefits of Bitcoin Blockchain
Ser Benefit Achieved by
1. Avoids single point of failure Distributed public ledger and decentralization
2. No central authority or third party mediation Validating the TXs with the consensus of network
nodes
3. No central database Distributed public ledger
4. Resilience to node compromise Network consensus and state machine replication
5. Auditable and immutable TXs The recording of validated TXs in an unforgeable
blockchain with a timestamp makes them always
available for the audit. However, if an attacker
acquires 51% or more hash power then he can
change the history of the blockchain and double-
spend the TXs
6. Transparency TXs are publicly announced to enable all nodes of
the blockchain network to maintain a same copy
of the order of TXs. Moreover, the TXs are pub-
lished on the blockchain in clear text.
7. Pseudo-anonymity Hash of Public Keys
8. Trust-free operation Validation of each TX by network nodes
9. TX authentication and non-repudiation Signing of TXs by the user's private key us-
ing Elliptic Curve Digital Signatures Algorithm
(ECDSA) [43]
10. TX integrity Taking SHA-256 hash of a TX
11. Protection against replay attack Use of time stamps
Mining. It is the process of adding validated TXs to a block and then broadcasting that block on the255
blockchain network, to be known by all the nodes. The mining is done by miner nodes, and the selection of
a node to mine a new block is done based on certain lottery schemes. In case of Bitcoin, miners compete
to solve a cryptographic hash puzzle and whosoever finds the solution (also known as proof of work) first,
is eligible to mine the next block. When a block is mined and added to the blockchain, then the TXs in
that block are confirmed [46]. Irrespective of the type of blockchain platform, usually some lottery scheme is260
required to randomly select a miner to propose or mine a new block.
Simple/Normal Node. There may be different types of nodes in a blockchain network depending upon
their capabilities and resources such as computation capability and memory size. A node may be a simple
node, which can only send and receive a TX and does not store the complete copy of the blockchain. In
case of an IoT environment a simple node can be an Arduino-based sensor node, that can only send a sensor265
reading to the gateway device or receive some commands.
Full Nodes. These nodes maintain a complete copy of the blockchain, but they do not mine a block. How-
ever, full nodes validate TXs based upon the consensus rules of the respective blockchain and contribute
in accepting or forking out a block [47]. A double-spending or a malicious TX may not even be routed or
relayed by a full-node. This implies that full nodes are capable of TX and block propagation. Hence, full270
nodes are essential for the security of the blockchain. In an IoT environment a Raspberry Pi (Rpi) with more
computational and memory resources as compared to an Arduino, can be a full node [48]. It was also tested
by running a Go Ethereum version geth-linux-arm7-1.8.3 on a Rpi-3 based sensor node.
Miner/Validator Nodes. These are the full nodes that have the additional capability to mine or validate
a new block thus extending the blockchain [47]. Moreover, mining nodes are selected as per specific criteria275
based upon the type of consensus protocol being used in the blockchain. E.g., In Bitcoin, the mining nodes
have to solve a cryptographic puzzle, and the node that does it first is eligible to mine the block. The miner
node has to submit a Proof of Work (PoW) along with the mined block so that the rest of the nodes can
validate that the puzzle has been correctly solved. If the block is accepted by the rest of the network, the
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miner node then earns a block reward and TX fee in the form of respective cryptocurrency. Whereas, in280
Proof of Stake (PoS) consensus protocol, miner nodes are selected randomly based on the coinage, i.e., the
number of coins they own and the time since they have those coins. However, in most of the (Byzantine
Fault Tolerance) BFT-based consensus protocols, the validator is elected in a round robin fashion to propose
a new block. The rest of the member nodes of the quorum, vote on the validity of the block and its TXs. In
most of the cases, the block is validated and included in the blockchain upon getting 2/3 majority votes in285
its favor.
TX/Block Finality. It is related to the final confirmation or approval of a particular TX or a block by the
consensus protocol of respective blockchain. It is an important aspect as it infers delay in TX confirmation
and ultimately affects the TX throughput of the blockchain. E.g., In Bitcoin, a TX gets one confirma-
tion/approval after 10 minutes, i.e., once the block containing that TX is mined. However, to get a final290
confirmation, the TX has to wait until additional five blocks are mined and appended to the block contain-
ing that particular TX. Hence, it takes 60 minutes to finally declare a TX confirmed/approved in Bitcoin
blockchain. Whereas, in other blockchains such as Hyperledger [49] and Tendermint [50] the TX gets instant
confirmation.
Permissioned vs. Permissionless Blockchains. Before defining Public and Private blockchain types,295
it is imperative to highlight that a blockchain can be a permissioned or a permissionless blockchain based
on the restrictions to process the TXs, i.e., creating new blocks of TXs. In a permissionless blockchain, any
node can create new blocks of TXs, whereas, in a permisisoned blockchain, TX processing is performed by
selected nodes only. As far as the terminology of a Public and a Private blockchain is concerned, it relates
to the access to the blockchain data [51].300
Public Blockchain. It may be a permissionless digital ledger that allows free and unconditional participa-
tion by any node [51]. Mining in public blockchains is mostly incentive-based, so that miners are encouraged
to mine a block. Hence, public ledgers bear more TX cost than private ledgers [45]. Whereas, the connec-
tivity between nodes in public blockchain is less than in private blockchain, therefore, it takes a longer time
to finalize the TXs [7]. Moreover, to achieve transparency in permissionless blockchains, all the TXs are305
visible to the public. Hence, issues related to user anonymity and data privacy emerge. Moreover, public
blockchains have low TX throughput because of poor TX finality, especially in PoW based blockchains [52].
Real world examples of public blockchains are; Bitcoin [42], Ethereum [53], IOTA [54], Litecoin [55], Lisk
[56], etc.
Private Blockchain. It can be a permissioned ledger, in which the number of the miner nodes is limited,310
and their IDs are known. Hence, TX processing is restricted to the selected/pre-defined miner or validator
nodes only. Moreover, a user may have access only to those TXs that are directly related to him [51]. E.g.,
Hyperledger-Fabric enables competing businesses and groups to maintain privacy and confidentiality of their
TXs, using “Private Channels” [57]. Private channels can be termed as restricted messaging paths that
can be used to provide TX privacy and confidentiality for specific subsets of network members. All data,315
including TX, member and channel information, on a channel, are invisible and inaccessible to any network
members not explicitly granted access to that channel. Hence, comparing to the public ledgers, there can be
more privacy of user information in the private blockchains. Another difference between public and private
blockchains is the extent to which they are centralized or ensure anonymity [7]. TX costs in private ledgers
are also low amid less number of nodes [45]. Due to immediate TX finality permissioned blockchains have320
high TX throughput [52]. Therefore, it can be attributed that private blockchains are faster than public
blockchains. However, private blockchains with BFT-based consensus protocols suffer from poor scalability
issues in terms of number of validator nodes. In addition, according to [43] the TX record in these types of
blockchains can be tampered with due to its partial centralization (known and less number of mining nodes).
Concerning IoT systems, which are mostly private, a permissioned blockchain is the appropriate ledger tech-325
nology. Some of the examples of real-world implementation of private ledgers include; Hyperledger [58],
Multichain [59], Quorum [60], etc. The key differences between public and private blockchains are shown in
Table-2.
Hybrid Blockchain. Being a balance between public and private blockchain, it is also called as “Partially
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Table 2: Public vs Private Blockchains
Public (may be Per-
missionless) Blockchain
Private (may be Per-
missioned) Blockchain
Permissionless participation Permissioned participation
IDs of nodes are not known (Use of pseudony-
mous IDs)
IDs of nodes are known [51]
Unlimited number of nodes A limited number of nodes
Less data privacy Options available for data security
Poor consensus finality [61] Instant consensus finality (In BFT-based
blockchains) [61]
Low TX throughput [52] High TX throughput [52]
Good scalability (concerning the number of miner
nodes) [52]
Poor scalability (In BFT-based blockchains) [52]
Vulnerable to 51% attack (In case of PoW and
PoS blockchains)
Vulnerable to node collusion (In BFT-based
blockchains) [51]
Decentralized” or “Consortium Blockchain”, [7]. E.g., In a consortium of ten industrial organizations, every330
organization maintains a mining/validating node in the blockchain network. In this case, a block may be
valid only if it has been signed by minimum seven nodes. All the nodes may have open read access to the
blockchain, or it can be restricted to specific nodes only [62]. However, there is a possibility of tampering
with blockchain record due to reduced decentralization [43].
Blockchain Forks. Most of the public blockchains are prone to forks, i.e., if a miner node mines a block335
and the rest of the network rejects that block due to consensus rules violation, then the small chain extending
from the rejected block onwards is forked, and the other longest chain extending from the correct block will
be accepted as the valid chain. One of the main reason of forks in public blockchains is due to the consensus
mechanism such as PoW, PoS, PoET, and PoA, in which there is no consensus finality once a block is mined.
The consensus is achieved subsequently once succeeding blocks keep on extending the chain leading from340
the older block. The forks can be soft and hard depending upon acceptance and removal by the upgraded
(following new consensus rules) and non-upgraded nodes (following old consensus rules) [46].
A hard fork is created intentionally once a system is upgraded or an important change in consensus rules
is deemed necessary. Hence, the latest version of consensus rules is not compatible with the older version.
Therefore, a block following the new consensus rules is accepted by upgraded nodes but rejected by the345
non-upgraded nodes and when the mining software gets blockchain data from the non-upgraded nodes, it
refuses to build on the same chain and accepts data only from the upgraded nodes. This creates permanently
divergent chains, one for non-upgraded nodes and one for upgraded nodes.
The soft fork is formed when a block violating new consensus rules is rejected by the upgraded nodes but ac-
cepted by non-upgraded nodes. It is possible to keep the blockchain from permanently diverging if upgraded350
nodes control the majority of the hash rate [46].
From IoT perspective, blockchain forks are not desired as they cause a delay in TX confirmation. E.g., In
Bitcoin, due to the blockchain forks, a TX has to wait for six additional blocks to be mined over its respec-
tive block, to be considered confirmed. This wait time of six blocks infers a delay of 60 minutes in a TX
confirmation. Whereas, in case of near-realtime IoT systems such as smart cars, intelligent traffic monitoring355
systems, drones, health monitors, a delay in TX confirmation can lead to a substantial physical and financial
damage.
Smart Contracts. Exploiting the Bitcoin's ability to execute autonomous scripts, developers have created
new versions of the blockchain that can perform arbitrary computations other than transferring coins. E.g.,
Ethereum blockchain [13] implements scripts called smart contracts [13] that can run any algorithm encoded360
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in them as a part of the TX [63]. Being deployed on the blockchain, the smart contracts are also called as
“Decentralized Applications or DApps”. Since smart contracts reside on the blockchain, they have a unique
address. A smart contract can be triggered by addressing a TX to it under some rules that govern the
contract. Smart contracts can be used in applications like auto-pay (shopping, parking, route management,
tolls, fuel payment), digital rights management, financial services including loan, inheritances, escrow, cryp-365
tocurrency wallet controls, capital markets, mortgage, automatic payment of insurance claims [64], SCM and
smart grid [65, 4].
The key idea behind smart contracts is the development of autonomous objects or IoT devices that cannot
only rent or sell their data but also maintain their operability by paying for the maintenance services. Such
an autonomous system is likely to contribute to the development of an overall “Economy of Things” with370
the goal of providing efficient and consistent services without any intermediary.
Consensus Protocol. It is the mechanism or set of rules that enables all the full nodes to reach an agree-
ment over the order of TXs. There are many types of consensus protocols being used in different blockchain
applications. E.g., PoW, PoS, Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT), etc. Some of the notable con-
sensus protocols are being discussed in succeeding paras.375
Consensus Finality. It means, the convergence of the blockchain consensus process on a particular
block/order of TXs. However, in reality, a consensus process may result into a permanent block or a stale
block that may be forked out later. This aspect is further illustrated by Vitalik Buterin in [61], that the
finality of a TX is always probabilistic. However, it may stand true for a PoW, PoS or PoET consensus pro-
tocols [66], but other consensus protocols may have different finality guarantees. Such as Casper [61] offers380
stronger finality guarantees as compared to PoW consensus and similarly, BFT-based consensus protocols
provide immediate consensus finality [67, 66], and the TXs once confirmed are not forked out later. From IoT
point of view consensus finality is an essential requirement in most of the IoT systems as it also influences
latency in TX confirmation.
Proof of work (PoW). It is the computation of a cryptographic hash function with some degree of diffi-385
culty [42], i.e., selecting a nonce such that the computed cryptographic hash has a specific number of zeros
in the start as defined by the level of difficulty. PoW forms the basis of consensus tactics in Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies. When a miner node solves the PoW, it is eligible to mine a new block. Whereas,
other full nodes in the network mutually confirm its correctness [43]. PoW protects against double-spending
attacks. Since it is computationally intensive, it is challenging for a single attacker to solve the difficulty390
for all the modified blocks before the honest nodes in the network [42]. It is a common perception that if a
malicious miner or a pool of miners gain 51% of the total network hash power, they can control the network
[68]. However, authors in [69] prove that the malicious/dishonest miners resorting to selfish mining strategy
can gain more revenue by only 25% of the total hashing power. Therefore, minimum 2/3 of the network
nodes need to be honest to protect against selfish mining; a simple majority is not enough. Moreover, public395
networks with pseudonymous user IDs are prone to Sybil attack. Therefore, Satoshi Nakamoto conceived
PoW-based consensus for Bitcoin blockchain to make Sybil attacks more expensive to be launched [67, 70].
Proof of Stake (PoS). It was conceived based on an idea described in [71] to improve upon PoW's high
latency, high computation, and high energy costs. PoS implies that the people with high stakes are less likely
to attack the respective network. Hence, an entity with the highest coinage, i.e., number of coins times the400
days, will be eligible to mine a new block. Moreover, the mining difficulty is inversely proportional to the
coinage [8]. However, once the miners claim the reward, the coinage is reset so that other miners/stakeholders
also get the chance to mine a block. Therefore, if an attacker wants to launch an attack similar to 51% attack,
he must own enough coins so that even when the coinage is reset, he can still gain more than half of the
odds [8]. In addition, Nicolas Houy in [72] proves that PoS is vulnerable to a 51% attack, as the few rich405
stakeholders can collude to manipulate the state of the ledger. Nevertheless, the probability of a 51% attack
in PoS is considered to be lower as compared to the PoW [73]. Moreover, the maximum TX rate a PoS
protocol has achieved is a few hundred TPS (Transactions Per Second) as compared to Visa's peak capacity
of 56000 TPS [74, 75]. Due to the lack of consensus finality, PoS-based consensus can also lead to blockchain
forks [74]. A variation of PoS named “Delegated Proof of Stake” (DPoS) [76, 77] implemented in Bitshare,410
11
a digital currency, is considered to be more efficient than PoS in terms of TX confirmation time. Moreover,
it can tolerate up to 50% malicious nodes [43, 68].
Proof of Activity. Proof of Activity is a combination of PoW and PoS [78]. It has been developed in
the wake of an assumption based on an economic phenomenon called “Tragedy of the Commons”. Which
implies that over the period the block reward in PoW-based cryptocurrencies will subside, hence, the miner415
nodes will have less interest in ensuring the security of the network, thereby making it vulnerable to various
attacks. Therefore, the proposed Proof of Activity protocol aims to increase the cost of an attack for a
malicious user by forcing it to achieve eight times faster hash rate than the honest miners in the network.
In addition, it reduces the computation complexity to 1/10th of the Bitcoin PoW, hence, minimizing the
energy consumption as well. However, Proof of Activity also aims to secure only cryptocurrency applications.420
Proof of Authority (PoA). Based on PoS, PoA is developed as an alternative to PoW in private blockchains.
It has been implemented by Parity [79]. In this protocol, the authorities are pre-determined and each au-
thority is assigned a fixed time slot within which it can generate blocks. Each authority is known based on
its true ID, therefore, instead of monetary value at stake, PoA implies validator's ID at stake. Hence, any
misconducting validator will be publicly known [80]. PoA makes a strong assumption that the authorities425
are trusted, and therefore, it is only suitable for permissioned ledgers. However, PoA is also being used by
Ethereum test network Kovan [81].
Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET). To address the problems of high power consumption and latency in
the PoW-based consensus protocols, Intel developed a lottery-based consensus protocol named “PoET” for
Sawtooth Lake, a blockchain-based distributed application platform. According to this protocol, the miner430
node which presents the least waiting time is selected to mine the next block. The PoET leader election pro-
tocol meets the criteria for a good lottery algorithm, i.e., fairness, investment and verification. It randomly
distributes leadership election across the entire population of the validators. PoET is secured by Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE) through Intel's Software Guard Extension [82]. Except leader election based
on PoET for which specialized hardware is required, rest of the protocol works like Bitcoin protocol. The435
trust is also placed in the hardware that generates the random wait time.
The Proof of Burn (PoB). It implies that the users send coins to a verifiable but an unspendable address,
thus burning the coins, to be eligible to mine a block [83]. The difference between PoW and PoB is that PoB
has no energy costs and its economic implications add towards the stability of the network. PoB has been
adopted by a cryptocurrency Slimcoin [84].440
BFT-based Consensus. BFT is a family of state machine replication protocols [85, 86] that protects
against arbitrary faults by replicating the services on multiple nodes. The safety and liveness property of
BFT protocols can tolerate no more than (n− 1)/3 faulty replicas over the lifetime of the system [87], where
n is the total number of replicating nodes. However, in reality, any number of nodes can get malicious or
show abnormal behavior [30]. In contrast to PoW, BFT-based protocols require the IDs of the consensus445
nodes to be known, hence making it suitable for permissioned blockchains [67]. BFT-based state-machine
replication protocols are considered to have poor scalability as they have never really been tested for the
scalability beyond 10-20 nodes [88]. Similarly, authors in [89] state that BFT-based protocols are not con-
sidered suitable for a network with more than 100 nodes. The leading cause of the scalability issue seems
to be the network communication which often involves O(n)2 messages per consensus request [87]. Some of450
the variations of BFT-based protocols, which are currently being used in various blockchain platforms are
mentioned in succeeding paras.
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT). It is designated to be more efficient than a PoW con-
cerning latency and energy costs, but it can only tolerate up to 33% malicious nodes. PBFT [87] is considered
to be an expensive protocol concerning the number of messages required for consensus. The client's request455
is processed through 5 different stages, i.e., initially broadcast from client to all the replicas, then processed
through pre-prepare, prepare, commit and execution stage. Hence, in a network with four replicas, a single
request requires 32 messages between client and replicas, i.e., 4 in stage-1, 3 in stage-2, 9 in stage-3, 12 in
stage-4 and 4 in stage-5 respectively.
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Moreover, in every stage of PBFT protocol, the decision is based upon no of certificates received for the460
previous stage. The number of certificates required to make a decision depends upon the estimated number
of faulty nodes, e.g., to commit a message/request the replicas have to receive at least 2f prepared certificates
for that request, and to finally execute the request, the replicas need at least 2f + 1 commit messages. This
means that the number of faulty nodes has to be pre-determined. PBFT protocol guarantees liveness based
on weak timing assumptions. It operates in a primary-backup mechanism, and replicas move through a suc-465
cession of configurations called views. Replicas initiate a change-view request, i.e., elect a new primary, when
a respective primary fails or does not respond in a set timeout period [87, 90]. Such weakly synchronous
protocols are expected to degrade significantly when the underlying network behaves in an unpredictable
manner. Therefore, the asymptotic communication complexity of PBFT in worst conditions can rise to ∞
[70]. Moreover, such a mechanism is expected to be vulnerable to less throughput in case of frequent network470
failures, and even DoS attacks, where a persistent adversary causes network interruptions.
In a demonstration of such a DoS attack, authors in [70] implemented a malicious network scheduler to
intercept and delay all view change messages of a PBFT protocol. They concluded that due to network
interruptions and weak synchrony property of PBFT, the replicas remained stuck in view changes and never
moved forward. They also deduced that such behavior is not restricted to PBFT. Instead, all protocols that475
rely on weak timing assumptions to tackle crashes can be affected by DoS attacks.
DBFT (Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance). DBFT has been implemented by NEO [91], an open
source blockchain project. NEO aims to realize the goal of the smart economy by employing the triad of
digital assets, digital ID and smart contracts. DBFT consensus protocol is based on proxy voting. The NEO
holders select the delegates/bookkeeper nodes that maintain the digital ledger. A speaker is selected amongst480
all the bookkeeping nodes, and together these nodes reach an agreement and generate new blocks. The pro-
tocol is tolerant to f = (n− 1)/3 faults [91, 92], where, n is the total number of delegates/bookkeeper nodes
and f is the number of faulty nodes in a consensus process. NEO provides efficiency by generating a block
in 15-20 seconds with a throughput of 1000 TPS [91, 93, 94]. A new block is generated at the end of each
round based on at least n − f signatures by the bookkeeping nodes [92, 93]. During the consensus process,485
DBFT also depends upon weak-synchrony (weak timing assumption). Hence, a view change is requested by
the nodes if consensus does not take place in a particular view [92]. Therefore, DBFT is also vulnerable to
DoS attacks based on network failures/interruptions. However, DBFT provides consensus finality without
any risk of blockchain forks [74]. As far as communication complexity is concerned, for one client and four
validator nodes, DBFT consensus require ten messages to process a TX.490
Honeybadger-BFT. It is designed and optimized for a cryptocurrency scenario with restricted bandwidth
but significant computing power [70]. It employs a BFT atomic broadcast protocol that provides optimal
asymptotic communication complexity of O(n) in the asynchronous network setting. Therefore, it does not
rely on timing assumptions to make progress whenever messages are delivered regardless of actual clock time.
As per experimental results, Honeybadger-BFT provides better throughput in terms of TPS, than PBFT.495
However, it has been tested for the tolerance of up to f = n/4 faulty nodes only. Moreover, the latency
in TX confirmation also increases with the rise in number of validating nodes. Hence, while expanding the
network, there is a need to maintain a balance between the number of nodes, bandwidth utilization, and
latency tolerance level of the users/applications.
Tendermint. Based on BFT, Tendermint employs a consensus protocol without mining. A block is initiated500
by a proposer, which is selected in a round-robin fashion from dedicated validators (with voting power equal
to their bond deposit). TX validation is done based on majority voting, i.e., honest validators should have a
majority vote of >= 2/3 of the total votes. There are three standard and two special steps in each validation
round. The consensus process in deciding the next block can be extended to many rounds (no bound on
maximum rounds is given) depending upon certain conditions [50]. Some of these conditions include: the505
designated proposer is not online, block proposed by the designated proposer did not propagate in time and
even if there is a valid block, but > 2/3 pre-votes or > 2/3 pre-commits were not received by enough valida-
tors in time. This dependence on time can be exploited by any MITM (Man in the Middle) adversary who
can simply delay the messages from the proposers, thus forcing the protocol to go for so many rounds that the
system experiences delays in computing new block heights. To curb false block propagation by the proposers,510
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Tendermint employs a concept of punishment by confiscating the bond deposit of the faulty proposers. For
one client and four validator nodes, Tendermint consensus protocol needs to share 21 messages to process a
single TX. It can also tolerate at the most < 1/3 faulty/malicious nodes.
Algorand. Algorand is a new cryptocurrency developed to overcome the issues of TX latency and blockchain
forks in PoW, and PoS cryptocurrencies [95]. By using a Byzantine agreement protocol, a block is finalized515
at the end of the consensus process. Hence, TX confirmation time is brought down to an order of a minute.
It also protects against Sybil attack by randomly selecting committee members for the consensus agreement
based on their weight. Where weights are derived from the amount of money/cryptocurrency, one owns.
Thus, as long as more than some fraction (over 2/3) of the money is owned by the honest users, Algorand
can avoid forks and double-spending. It addresses the issue of scalability concerning BFT protocols such as520
PBFT, which are considered to be communication intensive and can scale merely to a dozen of nodes/servers.
It achieves this by randomly selecting a small set of committee members for each step of the consensus pro-
tocol.
Algorand avoids targeted attacks against the committee members by not using a fixed set of members. It
selects the members in a private and non-interactive way. The users compute a Verifiable Random Function525
(VRF) on their public and private keys. The result of the function indicates to the users that whether
they are selected to participate in the consensus process or not. In this non-interactive way of selection, an
adversary does not know exactly who the committee members are. Algorand, makes it further secure, by
selecting new committee members for each step of the consensus process. In this way, even if the attacker
comes to know about a committee member once he starts participating in the consensus process, his attack530
efforts are futile, as that member will not participate in the next step. Algorand is claimed to be resilient to
DoS attacks and it can continue to operate even in the absence of some of the users/nodes. As far as TX
throughput is concerned, Alogrand commits a 2 MB block in 22 seconds and on the average commits about
750 MB of TXs in an hour, which is approximately 125 x Bitcoin's throughput.
IOTA. It is a blockless distributed ledger developed to enable micropayments in IoT industry [96]. It em-535
ploys tangle, a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) to store TXs instead of a blockchain. It is believed to be
a successor of blockchain technology, as it addresses the issues of scalability and high TX fee. Latency in
TX confirmation is reduced by making consensus (TX validation) parallelized, and an integral part of the
TX generation process. IOTA does not require a miner to mine a block of valid TXs, rather, every node
approves/validates randomly selected two previous TXs, before initiating its own TX. However, for the TX540
to be valid, the node must solve a PoW-based puzzle (similar to Bitcoin). IOTA is believed to be suitable
for asynchronous networks, as all the nodes may not see the same set of TXs. Therefore, nodes do not have
to achieve consensus on which valid TXs have to be included in the ledger. Instead, a specific node just
decides between two conflicting TXs by running a tip selection algorithm based on Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) method, which selects a TX based on acceptance probability. E.g., A user runs MCMC 100545
times for a particular TX, and if that TX is accepted 51 times, then it means that the TX was approved
with 51% confidence. For high-valued TXs, the threshold can be set as high as 99% acceptance probability.
However, IOTA does not have consensus finality. Hence, it is also prone to forks which cause latency in TX
confirmation. It is also not clear yet that after how many direct or indirect approvals a TX is safe to be
declared confirmed?550
For better performance efficiency, even if a node does not initiate any TX, it still has to work by relaying new
TXs to other nodes, as each node maintains a record of TXs received from its neighboring nodes. As far as
security is concerned, to protect against spamming attacks, every TX is weighted based upon the amount of
work done during PoW by the issuing node. Authors of IOTA claim that it protects against double spending
and quantum computing attacks by capping maximum own weight that can be assigned to a TX by the555
issuing node. Secure and authenticated data sharing between multiple nodes is also one of the core features
of IOTA [76]. In spite of all these features, IOTA's security is questionable as some security researchers from
MIT Media Lab were able to break into IOTA's customized hash function “Curl” [97].
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4. Progression of Blockchain Technology and its Impact on IoT
Bitcoin blockchain has revolutionized the distributed ledger technology with its significant cryptographic560
security and immutability. IoT can leverage the key benefits of the blockchain (as shown in Figure-4) to
resolve its ever growing security and privacy issues. E.g., The challenge of secure data sharing between
heterogeneous IoT devices and guarantee of the trustworthiness of their data, can be met by the common
blockchain platform that guarantees the immutability of data. Therefore, the blockchain, with its decen-
tralized architecture and unforgeability, provides an ideal solution for IoT systems mostly operating in an565
untrusted environment.
IoT systems can also leverage blockchain technology as a secure, unforgeable and auditable log of events and
Figure 4: Blockchain for IoT
TXs, as per type of the application. It can also be used to set policies, control and monitor access rights
to user/sensor data and execute various actions autonomously based on pre-defined conditions using smart
contracts [13]. However, in the past few years, due to IoT devices' constrained resources; storage, processing570
and limited power, use of cloud services has been on the rise to leverage cloud's computational and storage
capabilities. But as discussed in Section-2, the cloud has its weaknesses. Therefore, it is imperative to high-
light the major differences between cloud and the blockchain.
As shown in Table-3, cloud services are provided under the centralized control of one trusted entity. Hence,
the cloud is vulnerable to the single point of failure concerning security and privacy issues [34] including575
data manipulation [36, 98], and the availability of cloud services. In regard to data manipulation, the cloud
service provider has to be a trusted party as it has control over the data stored in the cloud and related
services. Therefore, the cloud provider can manipulate user data [98]. Whereas, blockchain is orchestrated
in a way that all the miner and full nodes in the blockchain network maintain a same copy of the blockchain
state and the trust is distributed among all the network nodes. Hence, if one device's blockchain data is580
altered, the system will reject it, and the blockchain state will remain un-tampered. Correspondingly, single
point of failure also concerns the availability of the services when the cloud servers are down because of
software bugs, cyber-attacks, power problems, cooling and other issues, users find it difficult to access the
cloud services [36]. Whereas in the case of the blockchain, data is replicated on many computers/nodes and
problems with few nodes do not disrupt the blockchain services. The blockchain is therefore good for data585
security and availability. However, blockchain has a limitation that with every passing day the size of the
blockchain increases, e.g., the current size of Bitcoin Blockchain is 182.8 GB [99], and all the miner and full
nodes are required to store the complete blockchain. In case of IoT this challenge is more pronounced, e.g.,
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in a smart city IoT scenario, the sensor data coming from hundreds of thousands of IoT nodes will result in
a rapid increase in the blockchain size, and the constraint resources of IoT devices concerning data storage590
make it difficult to handle large volumes of data. Hence, this limitation affects the utility of IoT devices as
full or validating nodes in a blockchain network.
Cloud is also vulnerable to un-authorized data sharing. E.g., in the recent past, private data of 87 million
users was provided by Facebook to a British political consulting firm “Cambridge Analytica” without users'
permission [37, 100]. Such a data breach results in irreversible data security and privacy issues. Whereas,595
blockchain with its smart contract technology gives users the freedom to restrict access to their data to autho-
rized entities only, without placing trust in any third party or a cloud service provider [101]. Here a question
arises how the data is stored and managed by the miners without compromising its confidentiality? In this
regard a blockchain technology “Hyperledger-Fabric” follows a unique execute-order-validate architecture.
To support this architecture, there are three types of nodes in the Hyperledger-Fabric based on their roles;600
i.e., clients, peers, and orderers. The clients submit TXs in the form of chaincodes for execution. Whereas,
peers execute TX proposals for the validation and endorsement as defined by the endorsement policy. An
endorsement policy states that which, and how many peers are required to endorse the correct execution
of a smart contract. Finally, the ordering service nodes (orderers) establish the total order of all the TXs
and output a block containing TXs. Orderers are entirely unaware of the application state, and they neither605
execute the TXs nor participate in the TX validation process [102]. Hence, the execution of chaincodes
by limited peers defined through endorsement policy restricts the exposure of TX payload and client ID to
selected peers only. Moreover, to keep private data completely confidential from all unauthorized users, the
data values within chaincode/smart contract can be encrypted, before sending TXs to the ordering service
and appending blocks to the ledger [103]. The encrypted data written to the ledger can be decrypted only610
by a user in possession of the corresponding decryption key. E.g., if a user wants that his financial or health
related data should not appear in plaintext, he can encrypt the data with the public key of the user who is
entitled to view that data. The user can then decrypt the ciphertext using his private key. Data can also be
encrypted/decrypted using Symmetric-key algorithm such as AES. In addition to data encryption, role-based
access control can also be built into the chaincode logic [104].615
As far as issues concerning bandwidth are concerned, due to the full replication mechanism in the blockchain,
every node must store a copy of all the blocks [105]. Moreover, the decentralized nature of the consensus
process infers that nodes in the Blockchain network interact with other nodes to exchange information about
the blockchain to participate in the consensus process, validate TXs, and create new blocks [106]. Therefore,
Bitcoin-derived blockchain employs a gossip protocol so that all state modifications to the distributed ledger620
must be broadcast to all the nodes participating in the consensus process. Bitcoin blockchain being public
and permissionless, any node can join the network and participate in the consensus process. Hence, there is
a great likelihood that the node with the smallest available bandwidth will become the network bottleneck.
Moreover, as the size of the blockchain grows, the requirements for storage, bandwidth, and compute power
required for participating in the consensus process increases. Hence at some point in time, it may not be fea-625
sible for all the nodes to process a block thus leading to the risk of centralization. In a traditional cloud-based
system, such a situation can be addressed, simply by adding more servers, using load balancing techniques or
by increasing the bandwidth to handle the added TXs. Additionally, in the decentralized public blockchains,
it is very difficult to control the public nodes [107]. However, in the case of private blockchains, which are
mostly permissioned, only some selected nodes participate in the consensus process. Hence you have the630
ability to ensure that every node on the network has high computation power along with high bandwidth
internet connection. [107].
Moreover, due to the imminent increase in IoT devices connected to the internet there would be an explosion
in the volume of data produced by smart devices. Whereas, the existing cloud-based storage and computing
solutions cannot handle such a large scale data due to the IoT requirements of high availability, real-time data635
delivery, scalability, security, resilience, and low latency [108]. Therefore, it is believed that blockchain due
to its P-2-P distributed network architecture and state replication on all the nodes can augment the security
and real-time data availability of fog nodes as an alternative to centralized cloud storage and computing
[108]. However, still blockchain's scalability issue concerning the ever increasing size need to be resolved.
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Table 3: Cloud vs. Blockchain
Cloud Blockchain
Centralized architecture Decentralized control
Trust is placed in the cloud provider Trust is distributed in the network
Single point of failure (due to the possibility of data
manipulation by the cloud provider)
Distributed architecture with blockchain state repli-
cated on all the miner and full nodes
Vulnerable to data manipulation Immutable
Prone to un-authorized data sharing User defined access control based on smart contracts
User data under control of cloud provider Offers autonomous data sharing between
users/devices through smart contracts
Users are never clear about intra cloud TXs Complete transparency by maintaining an unforge-
able log of events and TXs
Not ideal for high data availability and low latency
requirements of IoT
Provides edge storage and computing in terms of
miner nodes that store the full copy of the blockchain
Costly infrastructure Less expensive
Coming over to the progression in blockchain technology and the suitability of a blockchain platform for640
an IoT environment, we carried out a comparison [109] of some of the most prominent blockchain platforms,
including Bitcoin [42], Ethereum [13], Hyperledger-Fabric [49] and IOTA [96]. Although, IOTA is not as
mature at the moment as compared to Ethereum and Hyperledger-Fabric but we have included it because
its architecture is different than blockchain, it offers fee-less TXs, and is designed for M-2-M interactions. It
also has potential to resolve blockchain's scalability issue concerning low TX throughput with an increase645
in the number of network users. As shown in Table-4, the main security and performance considerations to
ascertain the most suitable blockchain platform for an IoT system are as follows; the blockchain platform
should provide a hybrid network concerning validating nodes' participation. As some IoT networks such
as smart cities may have a large number of stakeholders willing to contribute to the security of the public
blockchain network and on the other side, there may be a private network such as a smart home, where the650
owner would be validating the TXs via a couple of home miner/validator nodes. Currently, only Ethereum
[13] provide such a hybrid technology, whereas, Bitcoin [42] and IOTA [96] support public participation. It
is also imperative to mention that the level of decentralization in permissioned ledgers is affected by the lack
of public access to TX validation process, as it is currently done by limited miner/validator nodes. Whereas,
the limited number of validating nodes is vulnerable to malicious collusion [51].655
IoT systems are deployed for multiple applications, varying from smart watches to Industrial Control Systems
(ICS), and again its the Ethereum and Hyperledger-Fabric that support multiple blockchain applications be-
yond fintech. Another important factor for an IoT system is low latency in TX confirmation which leads to
the requirement of instant consensus agreement without blockchain forks. It is evident from Table-4 that
Hyperledger-Fabric based on PBFT/SIEVE consensus protocols [87] addresses this issue with greater reliabil-660
ity. Another essential aspect is that IoT systems especially the sensors operating in a smart city environment
would be generating millions of TXs per day. Therefore, an ideal IoT-oriented blockchain platform should
not have a TX fee or gas requirement, e.g., Hyperledger-Fabric has the option to set Tx fee or not.
The modern IoT systems not only require M-2-M micro payment methods but also need controlled access
to user data, easy management of sensor policies and much more. Correspondingly, IOTA [96] is designed665
purely for M-2-M micro or even nano payments. However, currently IOTA has not yet implemented smart
contracts [13] which are essential for user-driven policy setting and access control rights. Whereas, currently
the requirement of smart contracts is met by Ethereum and Hyperledger-Fabric. Another important require-
ment for many IoT systems sharing private data of the users is confidentiality of data. In this regard, only
Hyperledger-Fabric provides data confidentiality and also ensures the limited privacy of user data by allowing670
the creation of private channels [57] and encryption of data values in chaincodes [103]. Private channels are
restricted messaging paths that provide TX privacy and confidentiality for specific subsets of network mem-
bers. All data, including TX, member and channel information, on a channel, are invisible and inaccessible
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Table 4: Comparison of Blockchain Platforms
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to any network members not part of that channel. Moreover, the execution of users' TXs/chaincodes for vali-
dation is not performed by all the peers. Instead, only one or more specific endorsing peers, as defined by the675
endorsement policy for a particular chaincode execute the TX/chaincode for validation [102]. Hyperledger-
Fabric also supports ID management and TX authorization through public-key certificates (from a trusted
CA (Certificate Authority)) which are vital requirements for IoT.
As far as performance is concerned Hyperledger-Fabric provides higher TX throughput than Bitcoin, Ethereum
Figure 5: Impediments of Permissioned Blockchains
and IOTA. Hyperledger-Fabric consumes minimal energy and computation resources by using PBFT and680
SIEVE (a variation of PBFT) for validation of TXs i.e., low energy and computation cost [113]. Unlike
Ethereum blockchain, it does not require any gas to process the TXs. Based on a BFT-based consensus
protocol Hyperledger-Fabric is a preferred technology for a permissioned ledger. However, there are some
limitations in permissioned blockchains (shown in Figure-5). Being partially-decentralized, the trust is placed
in some known miner/validator nodes. Hence, in the case of a successful malware attack such as Mirai [116]685
which can infect and compromise a large number of nodes for malicious purposes, the chances of TX and
block validation process in permissioned ledger to be affected are more than in a permissionless or a public
ledger with a huge number of miner nodes. Moreover, the user enrolment, authentication, and authorization
based on public-key certificates is currently dependent on a trusted CA, which brings some degree of central-
ization. However, a DKMS (Decentralized Key Management System) for Hyperledger-Fabric is under testing690
for release in near future [117]. Moreover, permissioned ledgers mostly use BFT-based consensus protocols.
Whereas, such protocols are prone to DoS attacks. They can usually tolerate not more than f = (n − 1)/3
faulty nodes. BFT-based protocols such as PBFT are believed to have high communication complexity, and
they perform very poorly in adverse network conditions. Moreover, BFT-based consensus protocols have
poor scalability, as the TX throughput decreases badly with an increase in the number of validator nodes,695
e.g., if the number of endorser nodes is increased from 1 to 14 in Hyperledger-Fabric, the TX throughput
decreases to less than 1500 TPS [118]. However, still BFT-based protocols provide low latency and much
higher throughput than permissionless blockchains.
To conclude, Table-5 presents a recap of what all IoT security and performance requirements are met by
the advanced blockchain technologies and what are still outstanding. Concerning IoT security requirements,700
many data and user security aspects have been addressed by the blockchain platforms except privacy pre-
serving computation on sensitive user data, and most of the issues related to device security including device
authentication, software integrity check, runtime/synchronized software update, detection of compromised
device, IoT-centric consensus protocol and IoT-focused TX validation rules. As far as IoT performance re-
quirements are concerned, some of these requirements are addressed by Hyperledger-Fabric. However, low705
communication complexity and scalability should also be kept in view while designing an ideal IoT-oriented
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consensus protocol.
Table 5 : IoT Requirements Vs Progression in Blockchain Technologies
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14. Restricted Network Access
√
(Ethereum & Hyperledger-Fabric)
15. Device Authentication None
16. Software Integrity Check None
17. Runtime/Synchronized Software Up-
date
None
18. Detection of Compromised Device None
19. IoT-centric Consensus Protocol None










(Ethereum & Hyperledger-Fabric based on
Smart Contracts)
2. Low Latency in TX Confirmation
√
(Hyperledger-Fabric)





(IOTA - TX confirmation rate increases
with the increase in network size)
Concerning suitability of an appropriate blockchain platform for IoT, as discussed in Section-3, BFT-based
private/permissioned blockchains due to potentially improved performance and user security are suitable for710
IoT environment. Moreover, the IDs of the nodes that can control and update the shared state are known in
permissioned blockchains [119]. Overall, private/permissioned blockchains offer more security and compar-
atively better performance than public/permissionless blockchains. The benefits of the permissioned ledger
(Hyperledger-Fabric) are shown in Figure-6. It is imperative to mention here that unlike other permissioned
and even permissionless blockchains such as Ethereum, Tendermint, Quorum and Chain, Hyperledger-Fabric715
has a unique TX lifecycle of execute-order-validate. In which, although all peers validate the TXs to up-
date the ledger, but not every peer executes the smart contract TXs. Hyperledger-Fabric uses endorsement
policies to define which peers need to execute which TXs. This means that a given chaincode can be kept
private from peers that are not part of the endorsement policy [102]. However, it is recommended that any
proposed solution should meet IoT security and performance requirements already illustrated in Section-2720
and the challenges (Section-5) to blockchain's adoption in IoT.
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Figure 6: Benefits of Permissioned Blockchains
5. Challenges to Blockchain’s Adoption in IoT
To identify some real issues concerning blockchain's adoption in IoT, we implemented a test case scenario
of an IoT-based supply chain monitoring system [109]. The customer orders frozen food products and also
decides a temperature threshold that has to be maintained during the shipment by the seller. An alert is725
generated for the customer, whenever the temperature threshold policy is violated during shipment. The
test scenario and the challenges discovered while integrating IoT devices with the blockchain are explained
in chronological order as labeled from 1 to 6 in Figure-7.
1. A Rpi-3 based sensor node (scenario-1) can be connected directly to the blockchain as a full node [48]
or a lite blockchain client [120]. A full node can validate other TXs, but a lite client can only keep a730
track of its own TXs.
2. The temperature sensor senses the environment and its value is extracted via a web UI (User Interface)
or a mobile app (application). The web UI or mobile app connected to the blockchain node push the
sensor reading to the blockchain through smart contract. Hence, a mobile or a web app is the interface
between IoT devices and the blockchain.735
3. In scenario-2 an IoT device can be a resource-constrained Arduino device or any other embedded system
capable of just sensing and transmitting the temperature sensor readings to a gateway device.
4. The Arduino-based sensor node communicates with the gateway device through slower and less secure
wireless communication media such as 802.15.4 [121], 802.11 (WLAN standards) [122], LoRa [123],
ZigBee [124], NB-IoT [123] and SigFox [125]. Resultantly, IoT systems are prone to data leakage and740
other privacy attacks [21]. Moreover, this arrangement also limits the blockchain-based device to device
interaction, as now only the gateway device can access the blockchain or smart contracts.
5. Just like in scenario-1, the gateway also connects to the Geth node through a web3 provider and pushes
sensor data to the blockchain through a smart contract using a web or a mobile app.
6. However, there were certain challenges observed during this setup. Firstly, there is a question of how745
to ensure the secure input of sensor data to the blockchain? Secondly, currently, none of the blockchain
platforms implement IoT-focused TX validation rules and IoT-oriented consensus protocol. Lastly,
an intermediary between the sensor node and the blockchain is the UI, which cannot leverage the
cryptographic security provided by the blockchain. Instead, additional device, web, and application
security measures have to be taken.750
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Figure 7: Challenges for a Blockchain-based IoT System.
As mentioned above, the primary challenge observed is the non-availability of an IoT centric consensus
protocol. It also has some embedded issues such as TX/block validation rules, consensus finality, resistance
to DoS attacks, low fault tolerance, and scalability concerning high TX volume, protection against Sybil
Attack, and communication complexity. Another related issue is the secure integration of IoT devices with
the blockchain. These issues are being discussed in detail in succeeding paras.755
5.1. Lack of IoT-Centric Consensus Protocol
Figure-8 presents a comprehensive comparison of some noteworthy blockchain consensus protocols. The
points shown in in green color are suitable for an IoT system whereas, points shown in red color are not
appropriate for IoT. The current consensus protocols such as PoW [42], PoS [71], PoET [82], and IOTA
[96] are designed for permissionless blockchains, with a focus on financial value transfer. However, PoS and760
PoET can also be used in permissioned blockchains [66]. These consensus protocols share a common issue
that consensus process is probabilistic and does not end in a permanently committed block. Hence, they are
prone to blockchain forks [74]. The lack of consensus finality results into delayed TX confirmation, which is
not suitable for most of the real/near real-time IoT systems requiring instant TX confirmation. Moreover,
PoET requires special hardware and the enclave that allocates wait time has to be the trusted entity. PoET765
is also proved to be vulnerable to node compromise [126]. In addition, as IOTA is currently in open-beta
testing phase, it is assumed that some questions related to its security and performance efficiency will be
answered in due course of time. E.g., Firstly, will it be an efficient IoT micro-payment system only? or It
will also support smart contracts like in the Ethereum and Hyperledger-Fabric blockchains. Secondly, does
it provide confidentiality of data? and lastly, what is the faulty node tolerance level of IOTA?.770
On the other hand PBFT [87, 90], DBFT [91], HoneyBadger-BFT [70] and Tendermint [50] are BFT-based
protocols. BFT is considered to be the desired protocol for permissioned blockchains, in which ID of nodes is
required to be known [67], but it also has certain drawbacks. Except for HoneyBadger-BFT, rest of the BFT-
based protocols are prone to DoS attacks due to weak timing assumptions [70]. Whereas, the protocols based
on timing assumptions are not suitable for unreliable networks, as liveness property of weakly synchronous775
protocols can fail when the weak timing assumptions are violated due to malicious network adversary capable
of launching DoS attacks [70].
The weak synchrony also adversely affects the throughput of such systems [70]. Another major issue with
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Figure 8: Comparison of Consensus Protocols.
BFT protocols is scalability concerning number of validator nodes since they are not usually tested thoroughly
beyond 20 nodes [67]. It can be attributed to the intensive network communication which often involves as780
many as O(n2) messages per block [87]. However, Algorand [95] claims to address the issue of scalability
by randomly selecting a small set of committee members for each step of the consensus protocol. It uses
Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) for random selection of the users. It is also imperative to mention that
in Algorand, the committee size is dynamic and is dependent upon two conditions, i.e., 12g + b ≤ Tstep.τstep
and g > Tstep.τstep, where, g and b is the number of honest and malicious committee members respectively,785
T is the number of votes needed to reach consensus and τ is the expected committee size. Concerning fault
tolerance, BFT-based protocols are only capable of masking non-deterministic faults occurring on at the most
f = (n− 1)/3 replicas [87]. Where f is the number of faulty nodes and n is the number of total nodes.
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As far as TX throughput is confirmed, BFT-based protocols can sustain tens of thousands of TXs with
practically network-speed latencies [127]. Another major difference between PoW and BFT-based protocols790
is the notion of availability, which is a critical requirement in real-time IoT systems, i.e., PoW being an
incentive-based protocol, does not guarantee that a pending TX will be included in the next block, as it is
mostly at the discretion of the miners to select TXs based on their fee. Additionally, bandwidth efficiency and
low communication-complexity are also critical requirements, because most of the devices in an IoT system use
wireless communication protocols and a typical smart city IoT network may comprise thousands of sensors. In795
this regard, PBFT is considered to be an expensive protocol concerning message complexity [128]. Therefore,
any current or future blockchain-based solution must be able to sustain a large number of IoT devices and
comply with the regulations of wireless communications as per respective country's law [129]. Moreover,
despite reduced communication complexity and suitability for asynchronous networks, Honeybadger-BFT is
not considered appropriate for IoT systems because of its cryptocurrency centric approach and low fault800
tolerance of f = n/4 faulty nodes only.
To conclude, certain aspects concerning the blockchain consensus protocols are required to be improved for
its application in IoT. These aspects include IoT centric TX/block validation rules, resistance to DoS attacks
(exploiting timing assumptions), increased fault tolerance (> 1/3 faulty nodes), and low communication
complexity.
Figure 9: Bitcoin TX Validation Rules.
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5.2. TX Validation Rules
The TX validation process in Bitcoin (shown in Figure-9) validates a TX based on certain rules including
correct TX format, valid signatures and the fact that the TX has not been previously spent [13, 130]. On the
other hand, (as shown in Figure-10) Ethereum blockchain validates the format, signatures, nonce, gas, and
account balance of the sender's account [13]. However, there emerges a question that can the existing TX810
validation rules of blockchain platforms be applied to the IoT systems? That usually comprise heterogeneous
devices, thus sending sensory values or data in distinct formats and different range of values. Moreover, IoT
devices are also vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Hence, a targeted or even a generic malware attack can infect
a lot of IoT devices. Subsequently, these devices may be turned into a botnet and used for further attacks.
Therefore, TX validation rules of fintech-oriented Bitcoin and general purpose Ethereum blockchain may not815
be suitable for IoT systems [109].
Figure 10: Ethereum TX Validation Rules.
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5.3. Scalability
It not only affects the blockchain size but also indirectly influences the consensus process. E.g., Rise in the
number of users will also increase the number of TXs. Hence, if the consensus protocol has less throughput,
then the latency in TX confirmation will be increased. Both the issues are being discussed separately in the820
succeeding paras.
Storage Capacity. A typical smart city IoT system with thousands of end nodes can generate a huge
amount of data in no time. This data is then analyzed to extract information for various applications.
Whereas, blockchain is not designed to store such a large amount of data. Moreover, the requirement of
storing the complete blockchain by the full and miner nodes limits the integration of resource constraint IoT825
devices directly with the blockchain. In addition, with the continuous increase in the size of the blockchain,
the storage requirements also increase thus putting more limitations on resource constraint devices to act as
full or validator nodes. The increased blockchain size also takes longer to synchronize once new users/devices
join the network. Therefore, it is a challenge to design a secure blockchain-based IoT solution which on
one side caters for the constraint resources of IoT devices and on the other inherit maximum benefits of the830
blockchain.
Inherent Latency of Blockchain. The real-time data sharing requirements of most of the IoT systems
like WSN, ICS, smart vehicles, intelligent transport system and smart grids, demand improvement in TX
confirmation time, without compromising on the security and performance of the system.
E.g., In a PoW-based blockchain, reducing the block generation time does lessen the TX confirmation time but
Figure 11: Disadvantages of Bigger Blocks
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to achieve the same level of security as with ten minutes Block time; a TX has to wait for more confirmations
because of less difficulty in mining a block. Moreover, with less block time there would be more stale blocks,
hence, an increase in the waste of computing and energy resources. Another factor associated with TX
latency is the block size. There is a belief that by increasing the block size, say from 1 MB to 2 MB in Bitcoin
blockchain, the throughput can be increased. But in reality, a bigger block will take longer to propagate in840
the network. Therefore, nodes with low bandwidth internet connections will suffer, and resourceful miners
with more bandwidth will be at an advantage [131]. In addition, an increased block size will also result into
the faster growth of blockchain size, that will affect the number of full nodes in the network, as more resources
would be required to store the complete blockchain. Accordingly, Figure-11 shows the disadvantages of having
bigger blocks.845
It is therefore concluded that to achieve security in a fully decentralized blockchain, there has to be a trade-off
between performance efficiency and level of security, to prevent the system bending towards centralization.
As a blockchain system with a certain degree of centralized control may have some security and trust issues.
5.4. IoT Device Integration
In the test scenario shown in Figure-7, the IoT devices send sensor data to the blockchain through a web850
UI. Same can also be done by running a JavaScript code in the shell or a mobile App. Presently, smart
contracts are only supported by some of the blockchain technologies including Ethereum and Hyperledger-
Fabric. Though Ethereum blockchain is currently the most tested and a reliable platform for multiple
DApps (Distributed Applications), however, it has a major weakness, i.e., the smart contracts execute in
EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) and do not communicate directly with the outside world. Therefore, the855
web3.js library is used as an interface.
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In such a situation, the blockchain is only useful as a secure distributed database. However, before the data
goes in the blockchain its integrity is dependent on the security of the device, web UI or mobile app. Keeping
in view the current IoT threat scenario, in which IoT devices can easily be compromised, and malicious code
can be executed remotely, the integrity of IoT devices would always be doubtful. Moreover, IoT data can860
also be corrupted due to some hardware/software failure or human error. Such an anomaly in sensor data
cannot be detected unless the devices are tested for any hardware failure, software misconfiguration or other
malicious modifications. At the moment, the only available solution is “Oraclize” [132]. It extracts data from
various sources including web pages, WolframAlpha, IPFS, and any secure application running on Ledger
Nano S. To prove the legitimacy of data, a “Proof of Authentication” is provided along with the requested865
data, i.e., the proof that data has not been changed and is in its original form as obtained from the source.
However, it does not support IoT devices.
Another aspect of IoT device integration with the blockchain is lack of resources to be a full node or a miner
node. Full and miner nodes are required to store the complete copy of the blockchain. Hence, a direct
interaction of the IoT device with the blockchain through a blockchain client software will have additional870
memory and computational costs. Therefore, due diligence is required for enabling IoT devices to have a
wide range of interactions with the blockchain [109].
5.5. Protection of IoT Devices against Malware/Remote Code Execution Attacks
This issue has two aspects, first is related to ransomware attacks, which has an insignificant effect in
the case of a distributed ledger. Until even few nodes are unaffected, the network still has the accurate875
replica of the distributed ledger. However, the second aspect is that a node compromised due to malware can
introduce fake/malicious data in the network. As in sensors-based IoT systems, each sensor has its unique
data which is event-based and is difficult to be linked to old TXs, unlike in Bitcoin. Therefore, it would be
very challenging for other nodes to validate a particular sensor data/TX. Hence, there is a requirement of
malware-detection/software-attestation in a blockchain-based IoT system that can detect malicious nodes.880
This aspect is further linked to the availability of a runtime software/firmware update mechanism. For
example, an IoT system is hit by a wiper or a ransomware attack that wipes or encrypts all data including
the OS/firmware files on end devices, thus making the devices non-functional. One of the recovery mechanism
would be to initiate a firmware update procedure.
5.6. Secure and Synchronized Software Upgrade885
Because of their critical functionalities, most of the IoT devices remain in continuous operation without
any firmware or software updates. Hence, they are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Therefore, there is a
need for a runtime firmware/software upgrading/updating mechanism. However, due to the decentralized
architecture of the blockchain, currently, there is no mechanism to ensure synchronized software upgrade in
the end devices.890
5.7. Additional Issues
In addition to the challenges discussed above, there are some more issues which have been identified from
the literature review.
User Privacy and Data Security. As discussed in Section-4, most of the blockchain platforms keep
on-chain data in plain text, where every TX can be checked, audited and traced back to the genesis block.895
Although, this level of transparency does help to operate in a trustless environment yet at the same time it
effects users' privacy and data secrecy. Moreover, the pseudonymous IDs used by the Bitcoin blockchain do
not guarantee total anonymity and thus are vulnerable to linking attacks [11]. Therefore, the applications
running on public blockchains need additional cryptographic security, once dealing with sensitive or private
user data along with some additional de-anonymization measures to de-link user ID.900
Concerning, user privacy/anonymity, currently, there are many variations of Bitcoin blockchain that claim
to provide anonymous TXs. For instance, Monero [133] ensures user anonymity by using a ring signature
scheme to make the TXs untraceable. Similarly, Zerocash [134] let its users to convert Bitcoins into Zerocoins
(anonymous coins) and thus make obscure TXs. However, it is to be well thought out that, how to ensure
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user anonymity on a blockchain while guaranteeing user authentication and accountability. Whereas, to905
ensure data privacy on the blockchain, the data can be encrypted. Correspondingly, a blockchain-based
smart contract system named “Hawk” [135] stores encrypted TXs on the blockchain. Similarly, for private
blockchains, Hyperledger-Fabric [57] addresses this issue by providing support for data encryption and sharing
of data using private channels. In the same way, Quorum [60] makes use of cryptography and segmentation
to ensure the security of sensitive data. However, still, there is a lack of blockchain-technologies that can910
ensure privacy-preserving computations and data analytics.
Integration of IoT Communication Protocols. There is an essential requirement for integration of
IoT communication protocols such as BTLE, Bluetooth, 6LoWPAN, 802.15.4, Zigbee, LoRaWAN, etc., with
blockchain for TX record, future verification and possible monetization [136].
6. Latest Trends in Blockchain-based IoT Applications and Related Voids915
Researchers and innovators around the world are developing and investigating ingenious ways to imple-
ment blockchain in IoT environment. These use cases aim to take advantage of inherent benefits of the
blockchain such as decentralized control, immutability, cryptographic security, fault tolerance, data integrity
and authentication, and capability to run smart contracts. Table-6 shows some of these applications, the
purpose of their development and respective blockchain platform. It is evident that not all the applications920
use open source blockchain platforms such as Ethereum and Hyperledger. Out of eight applications men-
tioned here, three applications use proprietary blockchains designed to their specific needs. Additionally, the
main characteristics of these applications are shown in Table-7. We have tried to highlight the answers to
certain questions concering these applications such as Why is blockchain used? What blockchain platform is
used? How is TX validation done? What conventional issues are resolved? and What blockchain issues are925
resolved? These applications are further discussed in detail with an objective to highlight their functionality,
special features, voids and any innovation or cutting-edge feature that aims to resolve some of the challenges
discussed in Section-5.
6.1. Autonomous Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Telemetry
To take advantage of blockchain’s ability to run smart contracts and network consensus on the validation930
of TXs IBM disclosed a Proof of Concept (PoC) for a blockchain-based Autonomous Decentralized Peer-to-
Peer Telemetry system (ADEPT) [136] in 2015. Based on Ethereum blockchain, ADEPT aims to implement
a decentralized, autonomous, robust, scalable and secure framework for IoT which has no single point of
failure. The proposed framework uses TeleHash protocol for peer-to-peer messaging, and BitTorrent for
distributed file sharing. As shown in Table-7, the proposed system aims to resolve the issues in conventional935
IoT networks concerning trust in a centralized authority/entity, single point of failure, user and data privacy
issues, errors induced through human interactions. It also endeavors to provide data privacy, user privacy, ID
management, user-defined access control for data, and scalability. Certain voids regarding its employment in
IoT are:
Voids. It is a PoC and requires further testing to ensure its reliability concerning security and performance940
efficiency.
6.2. Blockchain-based Security for Smart Cities
Key Features. In a conventional setting, due to non-availability of a universal standard for smart devices,
there are issues related to difficulty in sharing data received from heterogeneous devices and integration of
these devices to provide cross functionality. Hence, Biswas and Muthukkumarasamy in [137] present an945
overview of a blockchain-based security framework for secure communication between smart city entities.
Authors claim that the integration of the blockchain with devices in the smart city will provide a shared
platform where all the devices would be able to communicate securely. Moreover, use of blockchain will
prevent against data availability and data integrity attacks. It also provides an unforgeable log of TXs, that
can be later used for audit purposes.950
Voids. There is no qualitative or quantitative analysis of the proposed framework including computation
and transmission overheads. Moreover, it is not clear that what blockchain platform, consensus protocol,
and TX/block validation technique is implemented in the smart city application?
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Table 6: Blockchain Applications
Application Purpose Blockchain Platform
ADEPT [136] An autonomous, robust, scal-
able and secure framework for
IoT devices
Ethereum
Security framework for smart cities [137] Blockchain-based security
framework for secure commu-
nication between smart city
entities
Not mentioned
Secure firmware update [138] Blockchain-based IoT device se-




Smart home architecture [9, 139] Lightweight architecture of a
blockchain-based smart home to
control access to devices' data
Proprietary with no PoW
VANETS [140] Decentralized and self-managed
VANET
Ethereum
eBusiness model [141] Blockchain-based autonomous
sharing of data and properties
Ethereum
Transparency of SCM [142, 143] Object tracking and record of
ownership
IBM blockchain based on
Hyperledger-Fabric
Slock.it [144] Managing things' services
through smart contracts
Ethereum
Enigma [145] Privacy preserving data compu-
tation
Proprietary
6.3. Secure Firmware Update
Key features. It is a blockchain-based IoT device firmware update scheme that lets the devices to securely955
check the firmware version and its integrity and then download the latest firmware. [138]. This scheme
vows to mitigate the effects of cyber-attacks targeting known firmware vulnerabilities. It also avoids network
congestion issues, that may arise due to simultaneous firmware update/download requests by a large number
of IoT devices in an IoT network with thousands of devices, deployed in a client-server model. It also aims to
contain the size of the blockchain by avoiding the storage of updated firmware on the blockchain. Instead, it is960
done by implementing a P-2-P firmware sharing network using BitTorrent. However, it is not clear that what
all messages are logged on the blockchain for auditing. If all the messages related to firmware verification are
logged, then the proposed scheme does not mention that how it will manage the ever-increasing size of the
blockchain?
Voids. The proposed scheme has not been evaluated for the communication complexity and energy con-965
sumption. Moreover, it is assumed that all the nodes work correctly, whereas in actual setting any number
of nodes can be compromised. It is also not stated that how does the request node extracts and pushes
the model number and firmware version to a blockchain TX? Another issue is that the nodes do some PoW
to reach a consensus on the firmware verification. But it is not mentioned that what measures have been
taken to avoid blockchain forks?, what is the latency in TX confirmation? and how much time does a single970
firmware verification/update takes? It is also not mentioned that which nodes can perform PoW and which
cannot? The distribution of normal nodes (resource constraint devices) and the miner nodes is also not given.
6.4. Blockchain-based Smart Home Architecture
Key features. Ali Dorri and Raja Jurdak in [9] and [139] propose a secure, private and lightweight ar-
chitecture of a blockchain-based smart home application. Application of blockchain in a smart home differs975
from a conventional Bitcoin blockchain in many ways. Unlike Bitcoin blockchain, the local blockchain in the
smart home is centrally managed by its owner. It has a policy header, which also acts as an access control
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list that allows the owner to control all the TXs happening in his home. For device-to-device communication,
the miner issues a shared key between respective devices as per policy defined by the owner. The proposed
scheme provides controlled access to IoT data. It also ensures data confidentiality, integrity, and availability980
along with protection against DDoS attacks. It aims to solve certian blockchain issues such as computational
intensiveness, latency in TX confirmation and energy consumption by forgoing the use of PoW in block
mining. To reduce computational overhead, and energy consumption each block is mined without any PoW.
Moreover, the latency in TX confirmation is reduced by considering a TX, true, whether it is mined in a
block or not. In addition, the proposed scheme utilizes cloud storage to ease up the memory requirements985
for smart home devices. However, certain voids observed in this scheme are as under:
Voids. Few aspects need further explanation with reasoning. Firstly, the hallmark of blockchain is the
decentralized network, whereas, in this scheme the Home-Miner, CHs (Cluster Heads) and the cloud storage
are providing a single point of failure at the respective layer. Secondly, most of the blockchain platforms
validate TXs and blocks on a consensus decision by all the network nodes. However, in this case, it is at the990
discretion of the CH, whether to retain a block or reject it. Thirdly, it is only the Home Miner that mines a
block without any PoW, whereas, it is the difficulty level in PoW that protects the blockchain against double
spending and data forgery attacks. Lastly, in contrary to consensus-based TX validation in usual blockchain
platforms, the Home Miner checks all the incoming and outgoing TXs. Therefore, keeping in view the possi-
bility of Byzantine General's Problem [146], if the Home Miner gets corrupted or malicious, the integrity of995
the blockchain TXs cannot be guaranteed. The nodes use The Onion Router (TOR) for connection to the
overlying network to achieve more anonymity/privacy at IP Layer. The overlay network maintains Cluster
Heads (CH), that store Public Keys of the requesters, requestees and the list of TXs forwarded to other
CHs. It is up to the CH, whether to keep a new block or not, whereas in Bitcoin blockchain it is a consensus
decision.1000
6.5. Blockchain-based Self-Managed Vehicle Ad-hoc Networks (VANETS)
Key features. The conventional VANETS have a centralized managing authority. This arrangement has
many drawbacks from a single point of failure to present a lucrative target to the attacker. Moreover, due
to centralized management, it has less user privacy. To avoid such issues, Leiding. et al. [140] propose an
Ethereum blockchain based decentralized, self-managing VANET with a challenge-response based authen-1005
tication. The complete VANET is regulated by Ethereum-based applications (smart contracts), which are
used to enforce certain rules or provide different services. Each node/user is registered and identified by its
Ethereum address, i.e., a hash of its public key. To access services provided by Ethereum-based applications,
every node has to pay in the form of Ethers. Thereby the users fund the network infrastructure. The pay-
ment made by the users serves as the incentive for the vendors providing Ethereum-based applications and1010
associated services. In a real-world scenario, the Ethereum account of a user can be used to make automated
payments of car insurance, registration, additional services like real-time traffic update and payment of traffic
violation fines.
Voids. The proposed scheme does not explain how PoW will be performed by the miner nodes to mine a
block in the blockchain? There is no discussion about what information about each node will be published1015
on the blockchain? Certain other aspects also need due considerations, like, who will mine the block? How
will V-2-V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) communication take place in the blockchain-based VANET? and what is the
latency in communication? Latency is an inherent weakness in the blockchain protocol. Whereas, most of
the times, the nodes/cars connected to VANET need real-time information about traffic and road conditions.
6.6. IoT eBusiness Model1020
Key Features. In yet another venture [141], Yu Zhang and Jiangtao Wen propose a blockchain-based
decentralized electronic business model for the IoT. The proposed model aims to share paid data and smart
properties like a car, parking space, house, fuel, e-shopping, commodities, and services, by applying the
concept of Decentralized Autonomous Corporations (DAC). The key idea here is that DAC is automated
without any intervention by humans and make use of smart contracts for decision making. It enables rapid1025
information exchange among all stakeholders, i.e., sensors, computers, humans, DACs, buyers, sellers, etc.
Moreover, each device in IoT can serve as a service provider. The proposed model has been designed and
developed by modifying and optimizing basic elements and operating modes of the conventional e-commerce
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system. The efficiency is increased by removing the third party, working in low trust environment and
reducing latency. The DAC model can be deployed for each smart device/sensor to trade it's paid data for1030
some service like power, additional module and software up-gradation, etc. The authors implemented the
test case of the proposed model using Ethereum blockchain and aim to further develop an automated transfer
of ownership service for smart properties.
Voids. Although authors gave a detailed overview and insight into their proposed e-business model for IoT,
yet it was not clear, how the constraint resources of IoT devices like less computational power, small memory,1035
and low energy consumption will be met? The proposed solution mostly focused on the working of e-business
model, so there is a lack of discussion on technical aspects. Hence, details like, which are the miner nodes?
What data from the blockchain will be stored on IoT devices? What are the security measures used to protect
against device compromise and how devices are integrated with the blockchain? need more deliberation.
6.7. Transparency of Supply Chain Management (SCM)1040
Key Features. The blockchain is an ideal platform to ensure product authenticity and transparency during
its complete supply chain cycle. It will help in tracking the origin and the transformations undergone by
a product in the supply chain by maintaining a formal registry. The digital ledger can be connected to a
supply chain sensor network connecting cargo trucks, storage coolers, etc., to keep track of product location
and its environment parameters like temperature and humidity [147].1045
In a similar endeavor, Everledger, a UK-based global startup has launched a Global Digital Ledger based
on IBM Bluemix [148] to digitally certify diamonds to assist in the prevention of fraud. The digital ledger
stores complete data about diamonds including their ownership and TX history. The immutable ledger will
support owners, insurance companies, banks and law enforcement agencies to verify the complete life cycle
of a diamond since its discovery in the mine until its sale in the market and subsequent ownership. Till date,1050
Everledger has certified more than 1 million diamonds. The company has not disclosed any technical details
about Everledger. However, it claims to use a hybrid blockchain model to take advantage of permissioned
controls as in the private blockchains [149]. The company is also aiming to apply the same solution for the
security of fine arts, vintage cars and wine [142, 143].
Voids. Irrespective of practical manifestation of the blockchain in SCM, there is an inherent issue of inter-1055
facing blockchain and different types of physical devices. Moreover, there are questions related to the status
update regarding location and condition of a product in transit to a customer. Which is currently done
manually by a human or by a sensing device. Now in a distributed environment, no other sensor node knows
about the exact condition of this product once it has reached the warehouse, except the node reporting upon
it. Therefore, there has to be some element of trust in that sensor node, such that its input data is accepted1060
in the blockchain. Hence, if all the nodes are trusted, then there is no need of a blockchain. Moreover, if
there is no trust, then the complete supply chain is compromised, and any malicious node can inject false
data [149].
6.8. Managing Things’ Services through Smart Contracts
Key Features. To exploit blockchain's ability to run smart contracts, “Slock.it” was developed as a commer-1065
cial product [150]. It is a smart lock called Slock, which is controlled through smart contracts on Ethereum
blockchain. In practice, the slock can be any smart device available for rent such as bike, car, computer,
etc. Conventional smart devices are controlled by an app (application) for a pre-defined purpose. However,
using smart devices through the blockchain gives the users unlimited options and use cases such as renting
out rooms, cars, bikes, electronic appliances, and parking facilities. The founder of “Slock.it” in [144] demon-1070
strates the complete process of renting a slock. The perceived working of Slock.it is shown in Figure-12.
Firstly, the owner registers its slock/item for rent, on the app provided by the blockchain service provider.
As soon as the owner registers his device, the device gets a private/public key pair in the smart contract. The
owner then sets the deposit amount (same as security) and the cost per minute/hour/day for a particular
slock/item.1075
On the other side, when the client wants to rent a service/slock, the client just selects the desired item/slock
and then clicks the rent-it button to sign the contract. The client can also see the amount required to be




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12: Managing IoT Device Services using Smart Contracts
initiated on the blockchain. The TX confirmation can take some time equivalent to 1 or 2 Blocks generation
period depending upon the settings of the service provider. Once the TX is confirmed, the client can click1080
the open option and access the service. When the customer has used the service, he can terminate the service
by clicking the close button on the app. As soon as the service is closed, a TX is initiated on the blockchain,
and the client gets his balance money (Balance = Deposit - the cost of service) through smart contract.
The slocks/smart-devices are integrated with a blockchain-based smart contract hosted on a single or dis-
tributed blockchain servers, through embedded devices running a blockchain client software. The embedded1085
device can be a Rpi, an Intel Edison, Samsung Artik-5 or any other SoC (System on Chip) solution. The
blockchain client communicates with smart devices/slocks through Bluetooth, Z-Wave, ZigBee or any other
communication protocol supported by the service provider. Considering scalability factor, only initial open
and last close TXs are recorded in the blockchain. Rest of the open and close TXs during usage of the rented
service/slock are termed as whisper messages and are not stored in the blockchain. However, these messages1090
are verified through the private/public key of the client. The scalability issue can be managed differently
depending upon the system architecture and the type of devices being used.
Voids. Apart from inherent Ethereum blockchain benefits, Slack.it mostly focuses on the functionality of
the product. It is not mentioned that what security measures are taken to ensure device security.
6.9. Security and Privacy of Data1095
Considerable work has been done to ensure the privacy of user data on the blockchain-based networks.
A data management system for decentralized networks has been proposed in [151]. It protects against
issues related to data transparency and auditability, data ownership and access control. Moreover, Viral
Communications, MIT Media Lab has developed Ethos, a Bitcoin-like network for secure sharing of personal
data [152]. However, suitability of Ethos for its application in an IoT system still requires deep assessment.1100
In addition to this, a privacy-preserving decentralized computation platform named Enigma [145] has been
proposed. It ensures confidentiality of data by implementing secure multi-party computation guaranteed
by verifiable secret sharing scheme. Enigma restricts access to complete data by all the nodes, i.e., every
node has a secret share of data, and it performs computations on that particular share without leaking
information to the other nodes. Such an arrangement decreases memory requirement for embedded devices,1105
and the distributed storage enables performance of more intense computations on data.
Voids. Although, the idea of decentralized computation in Enigma seems feasible, yet the computation and
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communication overhead is required to be analyzed for its efficient implementation in an IoT system. Since
most of the IoT end devices like sensor nodes, communicate using wireless media. Any current or future
solution for secure data sharing and distributed computing must comply with the regulations of wireless1110
communications as per respective country's law. The distributed computation schemes like multi-party
secret sharing schemes [145], seems very efficient but their efficacy regarding bandwidth/channel utilization
needs to be assessed. E.g., In Europe for LoRaWAN protocol that operates on the 868 MHz frequency band,
the allowable duty cycle is 1% for each user/device [129]. Hence, any blockchain-based secure data sharing
platform for IoT systems should cater for such limitations.1115
7. Gap Analysis
In-spite of inherent benefits of the blockchain, i.e., TX integrity, TX authentication, non-repudiation,
an auditable log of events, etc., there are numerous challenges (highlighted in Section-5), that needs due
consideration for a secure adoption of blockchain in IoT. Further elaborating on these issues, firstly, the
current consensus protocols such as PoW, PoS, PoET, IOTA, PoA, and Proof of Activity are designed for1120
public blockchains (PoS and PoET also support permissioned blockchains) in which the miner is selected
based on some lottery scheme. Thus, a block is mined by the lottery winner without network consensus. The
previous block is confirmed only, once the next miner and the subsequent other miners extend the chain.
Hence, these protocols lack instant consensus finality and are prone to blockchain forks. As far as BFT-
based consensus protocols are concerned, although they do provide consensus finality and avoid forks along1125
with low latency in TX confirmation, yet they are prone to DoS attacks. Moreover, with an increase in the
number of replicating/validator nodes, the communication complexity also increases. On the other hand,
IOTA provides low latency in initial TX approval. However, it is currently not determined that after how
much time and indirect approvals the TX stands confirmed. This is an important aspect in near-realtime
IoT service management, such as toll payment by the smart car, payment for gas, parking fee, etc. Hence,1130
IoT-centric consensus protocol is required to be designed and developed duly considering factors such as IoT
centric TX/block validation rules, resistance to DoS attacks (exploiting timing assumptions), increased fault
tolerance (> 1/3 faulty nodes), consensus finality and low communication complexity.
If we look at the blockchain-based IoT applications, discussed in Section-6, Table-8 shows a synthesis ma-
trix, that pitches the challenges identified (Section-5) against the blockchain-based IoT applications. It is1135
evident that most of the challenges are not tackled by any of the blockchain applications. In this regard,
the foremost issues are lack of IoT-focused consensus protocol and TX validation rules followed by secure
device integration and secure firmware update. Only two applications, i.e., firmware update and smart home
mention consensus protocol. In that firmware update application only comments that it uses PoW consensus
for firmware verification. However, no further details are given as to how it manages PoW's computation1140
and energy costs and latency in TX processing? It also does not comment about any distinction between
the miner and normal nodes. On the other side, the smart home application uses a proprietary blockchain
platform and does not use PoW consensus protocol because of its high computation and energy costs and
latency in TX confirmation. However, the proposed scheme does not mention that how it selects miners for
subsequent block mining? Currently, it seems that only the smart home miner mines the block for all the1145
devices in a particular house, which is against the trust-free and decentralized architecture of the blockchain.
Rest of the applications do not discuss any issue related to consensus protocols.
Third hitch is regarding the scalability of the blockchain. Only four applications, i.e., ADEPT, secure
firmware update, smart home, and Slock.it address this issue. Generally, scalability can be interpreted in
terms of the size of the blockchain and latency in TX confirmation concerning network expansion. A typical1150
IoT system, e.g., smart city environment monitoring system may comprise thousands of embedded devices
with limited memory and power resources. The constraint resources cannot store the ever-increasing size of
the blockchain, which is required to maintain a full node. Hence, this aspect limits the number of full nodes
in the network. However, if there are less full nodes with mining capabilities, then it means the work load of
mining TXs will be on limited mining nodes, which may create a bottle neck and result into high latency in1155
TX confirmation. Therefore, due diligence is required in resolving the issue of scalability, as this limitation
has a significant impact on the design of blockchain-based IoT systems.
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The fourth issue is of secure IoT device integration with the blockchain. None of the applications brace this
problem. Therefore, there is a need to design and develop a method to securely interface IoT devices with
the blockchain such that the data from heterogeneous IoT devices can be directly sent to the blockchain.1160
It is also essential to ensure the integrity of IoT devices for correct operation in a trustless environment,
without the use of any additional hardware, e.g., trusted platform modules. The factor of secure hardware
is specifically mentioned here, as in practice manufacturers reduce the cost of IoT devices such as CCTV
cameras, embedded sensor modules, smart watches, smart TV, etc., by cutting investment on security hard-
ware/features and just focusing on the application features.1165
Protection against malware attacks and runtime firmware/software upgrade is another lacking area. Al-
though, authors in [138] propose a blockchain-based firmware update procedure. However, the proposed
scheme does not protect against node compromise attacks in which node hardware configuration is changed
to allow for back-door access later. Hence, an attacker can install malicious code in the memory of a node
to launch further attacks on the network like espionage and DoS by initiating unnecessary network traffic to1170
target legitimate users/applications.
Although most of the applications do not consider or need data security in the form of data encryption.
However, it is no more an un-addressed issue as the blockchain-platforms such as Hyperledger-Fabric and
IBM ADEPT provide data confidentiality and data privacy.
Another important predicament is related to privacy of sensitive data. In a blockchain-based distributed sys-1175
tem, preserving the privacy of sensitive user data such as financial information, health data, personal/house
security data, during distributed processing is still a big challenge. The distributed computation scheme
Enigma [145], seems very efficient but its efficacy regarding bandwidth/channel usage needs to be assessed.
Hence, any future solution should also cater for computation/transmission overheads and bandwidth utiliza-
tion.1180
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8. A Way Forward
8.1. IoT-Centric Consensus Protocol and Transaction Validation Rules
The design and development of an ideal consensus protocol for an IoT environment demands that the
requirements of a consensus protocol for a blockchain-based IoT system be distinguished from existing general
purpose and cryptocurrency oriented consensus protocols. Some of these requirements are shown in Figure-1185
13. The points mentioned in blue color are concerning security/consistency and the points shown in the green
color pertains to the performance requirements. The foremost requirement for IoT systems is that the TXs
should be validated based on IoT-centric TX validation rules. It is an essential requirement since every new
TX in IoT is mostly independent of the previous TX and an incident or change in environmental conditions
can influence the change in the sensor readings. Therefore, IoT TX validation rules should be carefully1190
drafted and they must incorporate environmental context, e.g., in a smart home, the fireplace is ignited, only
if the camera or any other sensor also detects the presence of a human in that room. It means a sensor
reading is validated based on the environmental context and not in isolation. The consensus protocol should
also be robust against Sybil Attack and must have consensus finality to avoid forks. Other than avoiding
forks, consensus finality is equally vital for achieving minimum latency in TX confirmation and the ultimate1195
high TX throughput. Moreover, IoT systems are also vulnerable to physical or cyber-attacks. In recent
Figure 13: Considerations for IoT Consensus Protocol.
past a cyber-attack named “Mirai” [116], infected a large number of IoT devices including DVR and CCTV
cameras and turned these devices into bots. The compromised devices were then used to launch a DDoS
attack on a DNS service provider “DYN” by directing huge data traffic in the form of millions of DNS lookup
requests. Whereas, if we look at the BFT-based protocols, most of them can only tolerate f = (n − 1)/31200
faulty nodes. Therefore, an IoT-centric consensus protocol must have the capability to sustain maximum
possible faulty/dishonest nodes. An important consideration to lessen the effect of faulty nodes is to carry out
random integrity check of the validator/mining nodes so that no dishonest node participates in the consensus
process [109]. In addition to the security requirements, there are some performance considerations as well.
These include low computation overhead, low energy consumption, and less communication complexity.1205
8.2. Managing Blockchain Size
To address the issue of scalability concerning the management of ever-increasing blockchain size on
light/embedded IoT devices, various blockchain architectures are being proposed such as sidechains and
treechains. An example of a sidechain is a decentralized P-2-P network designed for multi-party privacy-
preserving data storage and processing [153, 145]. The proposed model implicitly improves the issue of1210
blockchain scalability by storing user data on an off-chain network of private nodes in the form of DHT [154].
The blockchain only contains the pointers/references to data, and not all the nodes replicate all TXs.
IBM [136] also addresses the issue of blockchain size by introducing a concept of universal and regional
blockchains. It is achieved by categorizing the network nodes into light peers, standard peers and peer ex-
changes depending upon their processing, storage, networking, and power capabilities. The light peers consist1215
of embedded devices, such as Arduino and Rpi-based sensor nodes. These nodes only store own blockchain
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address and balance and rely on other trusted peers to obtain TXs relevant to them. Whereas, the standard
peers have more processing power and storage capacity than the light peers. They can store some of the
recent TXs of their own and the light peers in their neighborhood. Finally, the peer exchanges have high
storage and computing capabilities, and they can replicate complete blockchain data with an additional fea-1220
ture of data analytic services. In addition, as per NIST [155], resource-constrained devices may maintain a
compressed ledger containing only their TXs.
Authors in [98] and [156] also propose a scalable 2-layer blockchain architecture to log distributed database
TXs. The first layer represents a permissioned blockchain comprising a miner each from respective federation
members. The miners in layer one are selected randomly based on a fast consensus protocol. The hash1225
of the first layer blockchain is periodically stored on the second layer using PoW to ensure the integrity of
the hashes. Hence, if a malicious node alters the log in the first blockchain, the hash of the data would be
different as in the second layer. Hence, forgery can easily be detected. To achieve scalability in the proposed
scheme especially layer-1, these authors propose data sharding, in which every miner maintains a DHT-based
ledger on the basis of keyspace partitioning and only handles TXs for specific subsets of keys. Thus tuning1230
TX load on miners and making the system more scalable.
Another solution proposed for the scalability of Ethereum blockchain is called “Plasma” [157]. It uses a series
of smart contracts to create hierarchical trees of sidechains, which can be thought of as “subchains”. The
subchains live within a parent blockchain and periodically communicate with the root-chain (Ethereum).
The subchains are off-line, hence, theoretically, there can be as many subchains as desired [158]. Similarly,1235
BigchainDB [159] inrtoduces a blockchain database that utilizes the benefits of both, the blockchain and the
big data distributed database. It integrates the immutability and decentralization of the blockchain with the
high throughput and fast TX settlement time of big data distributed database.
8.3. Improving Upon TX Confirmation Time
TX confirmation time can also be associated with the problem of blockchain scalability. In current public1240
blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, the miner nodes are required to store the complete blockchain
and validate every TX in an order. This arrangement does help in ensuring the security of the system but
can also be prone to bottlenecks in case of high TX volume. Since, the blockchain cannot process more TXs
than a single node can. One of the methods being researched to reduce TX confirmation time is “Sharding”
[160]. It means a subset of miner nodes process a subset of TXs (as shown in Figure-14). The subset of1245
miner nodes should be populated in a way that the system is still secure, and at the same time, several TXs
can be processed simultaneously [158, 160]. In its purest form, each shard has its own TX history, and it is
affected only by the TXs it contains. E.g., In a multi-asset blockchain, there are n shards, and each shard is
associated with one particular asset. In more advanced forms of sharding, TXs on one shard can also trigger
events on some other shard. This is usually termed as cross-shard communication. However, currently being1250
in a novice state, there are numerous challenges that should be resolved before sharding is adopted publicly.
Some of these challenges include; cross-shard communication, fraud detection, single-shard manipulation,
and data availability attacks [160].
Another approach to reducing TX processing time is “Raiden”. It proposes the use of state channel technology
to scale the Ethereum network off-chain and to facilitate micro-TXs between IoT devices[158]. The off-chain1255
TXs will allow a set of nodes to establish payment channels between each other, without directly transacting
with the Ethereum blockchain. Hence, Off-chain TXs would be faster and cheaper than on-chain TXs because
they can be recorded immediately, and there is no need to wait for block confirmations. However, it is believed
that Channel-based strategies can scale TX capacity only but cannot scale state-storage. Moreover, they are
vulnerable to DoS attacks [160].1260
In another development, to address Bitcoin blockchain's problems of scalability, high TX fee and requirement
of substantial hardware resources, a blockless architecture named “IOTA” have been introduced [54]. IOTA
is a distributed architecture based on DAG called Tangle [96], instead of a conventional blockchain. It
aims to promote machine economy, in which smart devices can interact with each other by making smallest
possible, nano-payments. To ensure fast TXs, IOTA does not require TX fee. Moreover, the consensus (TX1265
validation) and normal TX process are also inter-knitted, i.e., before making a new TX, each user randomly
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Figure 14: Sharding
approves/validates previous two TXs. IOTA achieves high throughput by parallelizing the TX validation
process. Hence, an increase in the number of new TXs on the Tangle is inversely proportional to the TX
settlement time [161]. Therefore, an expanding network contributes well to the overall security and fast TX
settlement. The two TXs to be approved by every new TX are randomly selected based on MCMC (Markov1270
Chain Monte Carlo) method. A TX getting more and more direct/indirect approvals is considered to be
more accepted by the network. Hence, it would be difficult for anyone to double-spend that particular TX.
The difference between IOTA and a typical blockchain architecture is shown in Figure-15 [161].
Figure 15: IOTA vs. Blockchain
8.4. Secure IoT Device Integration with the Blockchain
In addition to securing the web UI and mobile App, IoT device integration with the blockchain can1275
be augmented by device enrolment, in which only approved devices be allowed to communicate with the
blockchain and call smart contract methods. Correspondingly, smart contracts can restrict access to selected
methods to a specific node only. Concerning physical security of IoT devices, all the unnecessary ports
such as JTAG and UART should be blocked. Since any open port can be used by an adversary to access
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Figure 16: Blockchain and IoT Integration using Fog Nodes
the device and make malicious changes. Moreover, most of the commercially available IoT devices such as1280
sensing devices do not have secure execution environment due to cost effects. Therefore, the device integrity
check should frequently be performed to ensure its legitimacy [109].
As of today, most of the IoT systems depend on a certain cloud platform due to computational and storage
scarcity and because of the same, resource constraints IoT devices cannot be used as a miner or full nodes
in a blockchain network. Hence, to ensure a smooth transition from cloud to blockchain based network,1285
IoT systems can leverage Fog Computing components that already follow some degree of distribution and
are more resourceful than IoT devices. The Fog nodes can function as blockchain miners and can facilitate
direct interaction between IoT devices and the blockchain. E.g., As shown in Figure-16, the fog nodes can
incorporate blockchain miner nodes to collect and mine the TXs received from the IoT devices in a block.
The IoT devices have enough resources to be the full nodes. Hence, they can store the blockchain and also1290
route and validate the TXs. In this way, most of the TXs from the IoT devices would be propagated to both
the fog nodes. Hence, IoT can leverage existing fog computing infrastructure to adopt blockchain technology,
until IoT devices are manufactured with embedded blockchain mining functionality to gain on the maximum
benefits of blockchain's distributed architecture.
8.5. Integration of IoT Communication Protocols with the Blockchain1295
To integrate blockchain protocols with the communication layer of IoT, [136] and [137] recommend the
use of TeleHash as the messaging protocol, which is based on Kademlia DHT [162]. It is a lightweight and a
secure P-2-P network protocol that uses encryption for secure mesh communication across multiple platforms
[163]. TX records can be converted into blocks and further broadcast into the blockchain network.
8.6. Resolution of Bitcoin Blockchain’s Limitations1300
Till now, we have analyzed every aspect of the blockchain, from its basic concepts to the advancements
in blockchain platforms, related challenges and latest trends in blockchain-based IoT applications. However,
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Table 9: Resolution of Bitcoin Blockchain Limitations
Bitcoin Blockchain Limitations Advancement in Blockchain Plat-
forms/Applications/Technologies
Energy and computation intensive PoW consen-
sus
PoS [71], PoET [82], PoB [83], PoA [79, 80], BFT-
based consensus protocols [70, 85, 86, 91, 92]
Lack of consensus finality and forks BFT-based consensus protocols [70, 85, 86, 91,
92]
Latency in TX confirmation Ethereum (GHOST, Casper) [13], Hyperledger-
Fabric (PBFT, SIEVE) [57], Bitcoin-NG [131],
and BFT-based blockchains [91]
Low Throughput BFT-based blockchains (Multichain [59],
Hyperledger-Fabric [57])
De-anonymization (Linking attacks) [11] Monero [133], Zerocash [134],
Scalability (Size of blockchain) Universal and regional blockchains (IBM) [136],
Sidechains [153, 157], Data compression (NIST)
[155], Scalable blockchain architecture [98, 156],
BigchainDB [159]
51% attack [5], Double-spending [42, 164] BFT-based consensus protocols [70, 85, 86, 91,
92]
No runtime firmware/software update Secure firmware upgrade [138],Gitar [165], Re-
moWare [166]
Data privacy Multichain [59], Quorum [60], Hyperledger-
Fabric [57], Hawk [135], DHT [154]
Privacy-preserving computation Enigma [145], Homomorphic encryption [167]
Limited scripting Smart contracts supported by Ethereum [13],
Hyperledger-Fabric [57]
Legal issues in smart contracts Alastria [168] (Idea of a national regulated
blockchain)
Public/Permissionless blockchain Private/Permissioned blockchains Ethereum [13],
Multichain [59], Quorum [60], Hyperledger-
Fabric [57]
we feel it important to present a consolidated gist of the evolution of blockchain technology that aims
at mitigating Bitcoin blockchain's limitations. This summary will help blockchain and IoT researchers to
understand related technologies and find their way forward to resolve blockchain-based IoT issues. Hence,1305
Table-9 pitches Bitcoin blockchain's limitations and vulnerabilities against requisite blockchain technologies
and applications that promise to abate respective limitations.
9. Conclusion and Future Work
No doubt, IoT is the future of an autonomous digitized economy of the world by liquefying and personal-
izing the physical objects [3]. However, to achieve this status, it has to undergo a conceptual transformation1310
both at the design and the development stages. That day is not far off, once machines will interact with ma-
chines without human intervention to achieve performance efficiency, durability, operational effectiveness and
financial economy. Therefore, it is imperative to design and develop a secure blockchain-based IoT system
that meets the future requirements of an autonomous digital world. The future IoT system should be com-
patible with existing IoT technologies so that the transformation from a traditional centralized architecture1315
to a self-maintained decentralized system is economically feasible. Moreover, performance aspects should also
be given due consideration, in parallel to the security issues. Hence, in this paper, we initially introduced
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IoT threat environment, resultant security and performance requirements for IoT systems and key blockchain
concepts. Then, we analyzed the impact of blockchain technology on IoT followed by identification of chal-
lenges to blockchain's endorsement for IoT. Later, we reviewed various blockchain-based IoT applications to1320
highlight the trends in IoT applications and the blockchain issues resolved by these applications. In the end,
we carried out the gap analysis and recommended a way forward to resolve some of the significant challenges
that hinder adoption of the blockchain in IoT environment.
In future work, the authors of this paper plan to develop a blockchain-based secure IoT architecture with an
IoT centric consensus protocol to ensure security as well as performance efficiency of the TX validation pro-1325
cess. Moreover, to ensure integrity of the IoT TXs, we plan to embed device validation in the TX validation
process.
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